A condensed version of the report may be read in Hungary Today.

Anita Orban’s Higher Education and Training (1998-2007)

Hungary’s new Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Anita Orban spent several years in the United States while receiving part of her education between 1998-2002. It is well known that during this time, Orban received two master’s degrees from Tufts University — one in History and one in Law and Diplomacy. In 2001, she began her doctoral studies, for which she would go on to receive a Ph.D.

Her 2007 Ph.D. dissertation titled, “Tanks have left, Gazprom is back: Russian Energy Companies’ Expansion Towards Poland, Slovakia and Hungary Between 1991 and 2004” includes a Curriculum Vitae (CV). While not a standard practice, the CV confirms well-known biographical information about Orban and also provides additional work details including her foreign policy internship at Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, in the summer 2000. Orban previously elaborated on this experience during an interview with then-candidate Peter Magyar in early 2026.

In the summer 2001, Orban worked as a Research Associate at the Hudson Institute, an American research organization focused on defense, international relations, economics, energy, culture, technology and more. Orban also held a position with the Forum of the Brzezinski Chair of Scholars, which was organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Name Dropping in her Dissertation

In addition to her CV, Anita Orban wrote a lengthy acknowledgment section, which contains personal life details as well as the full names of friends, mentors and colleagues who supported her throughout her doctoral research. In one paragraph, she specifically references two women, Susan Fink Yoshihara and Margaret Sloane. Orban wrote, “My great friends Susan Fink Yoshihara and Margaret Sloane were my hosts when I went back to Boston to do research and shared their apartments with me and thus made my stay and work a very pleasant experience. I thank you both very much.”

Susan Fink Yoshihara received a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. She is the author of Waging War to Make Peace: U.S. Intervention in Global Conflicts, which examines “the decision-making of four NATO nations―Britain, France, Germany, and the United States―in the 1999 Kosovo campaign” and compares this with “decisions in 2003 regarding the Iraq War.” More broadly, the book examines why larger, powerful nations intervene in smaller wars.

In addition to her writing and academic work, Yoshihara is the founder and President of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Council — a nonprofit organization of professionals that deliver “high impact education and policy analysis from (our) experience in the fields of national security, international law, development, religious liberty, human rights, and humanitarian action.” WPS Council works alongside the U.S. Government and non-governmental organizations to maintain the objectives outlined in the U.S. Women Peace and Security Act of 2017.

According to the WPS Council’s website, the organization’s mission is to “advance peace and security for women, their families, and communities through innovative education and policy design, thought leadership, and on-the-ground engagement.” Additionally, the organization “promote(s) foundational American principles of human dignity, individual liberty, and equality of opportunity for all.”

When serving as a Senior Advisor at USNORAD and NORTHCOM’s WPS Team, Susan Yoshihara advised the Department of Defense. She also provided expert testimony on human trafficking and on women and children in post-conflict peace building, among other subjects, before the United Nations (UN), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the UN Security Council and the UN Economic and Social Council.

Yoshihara has extensive military experience, having served 20 years as an active-duty Navy helicopter pilot. During this time, she “led combat logistics missions in the Gulf War, conducted humanitarian assistance missions in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific Islands, and served on the personal staff to the combatant commander of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet.” Yoshihara taught National Security Affairs, International Relations and related disciplines at the U.S. Naval War College. She was a White House Fellow from 1996-1997.

According to Yoshihara’s LinkedIn profile, she received Secret Security Clearance with the U.S. Department of Defense in January 2021 and a Certificate in Refugee Trauma from Harvard Medical School in April 2021.

It is not clear the current relationship between Yoshihara and Anita Orban. However, as recently as 2022, Yoshihara commented on a photo posted by Anita Orban in which Orban is speaking to graduating students during the Corvinus University commencement ceremony that year. Yoshihara commented, “Lovely, Anita!”

The other friend mentioned by Anita Orban is Margaret Sloane, who also earned a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. According to Sloane’s LinkedIn profile, she has been employed with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response since February 2021. Her specialties include weapons of mass destruction and national security.

Sloane previously served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) at the Pentagon. She worked as an Associate at Booz Allen Hamilton and held a position as a Senior Policy Fellow at the Center for the Study of WMDs at National Defense University. From 1996-1997, Sloane worked as a Research Assistant with the Council on Foreign Relations.

Earlier this year, Margaret Sloane “loved” and shared Anita Orban’s LinkedIn post promoting the TISZA Party.

Similar to Yoshihara, it is unclear how close their relationship is today, but the recent LinkedIn activity suggests, at the very least, that Orban and Sloane remain in touch and support each other.

A Network Emerges — The Fed, CFR and DARPA Connections

While pursuing her Ph.D. beginning in 2001, Anita Orban was advised by a committee of three faculty members, including the chair Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Dr. Lisa Lynch and Dr. William C. Martel.

Orban’s dissertation committee chair, Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., was a Professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University beginning in 1971. After Pfaltzgraff passed away in late 2023, The University of Pennsylvania published a tribute in his honor, which stated he was “the visionary behind the establishment of Fletcher’s International Securities Program, laying the foundation for numerous graduates to embark on impactful careers in foreign service and security intelligence.” And one of those graduates was Anita Orban.

In 1976, Pfaltzgraff founded and served as the President of the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). According to an archived State Department website, the IFPA is an independent organization that conducts research, prepares policy briefings and organizes conferences and seminars in the U.S. and internationally. The IFPA focuses on a broad range of issues including “proliferation, countering weapons of mass destruction, the future of alliances, security cooperation, national security strategy, military modernization and transformation, homeland security” and more. Similarly, according to the State Department’s profile on Pfaltzgraff, he specialized in international relations theory, counterproliferation, homeland security, missile defense, space strategy, the long war against terrorism and more.

Pfaltzgraff’s work went well beyond academic affiliations. He held high-ranking positions advising government officials on military and defense strategy, terrorism, national security and homeland security. He was a member of the Reagan Defense Advisory Team and briefed President George Herbert Walker Bush, Condoleezza Rice and others on foreign policy planning after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Published in a batch of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) archives, a letter dated January 1984 shows Pfaltzgraff was on a first-name basis with the then-National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe Milton Kovner. In Kovner’s letter addressed to “Bob,” he inquired if Pfaltzgraff would be available to open a session during a conference titled, “Europe in the Eighties,” which was to be held in the State Department in April that year. A few days later, Pfaltzgraff responded and accepted the invitation to speak specifically on “NATO and Western Defense: European Views.”

Pfaltzgraff was also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and served as a co-chair of the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense. From 2006-2009, he was a Board Member of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) of the State Department.

When reflecting on Pfaltzgraff’s advice and guidance in the acknowledgment section of her dissertation, Anita Orban wrote, “I am thanking the chair of my committee, Professor Pfaltzgraff for his comments and remarks on earlier drafts of the dissertation, which together with his clear guidance were instrumental in building the cases, writing the theoretical chapter, structuring the problem and sharpening the argument. The fact that he commended the theory chapter means a lot and makes all the work worthwhile.”

The second advisor on Anita Orban’s doctoral committee was Dr. Lisa Lynch, an economist who has held numerous positions with the Federal Reserve and other economic and financial institutions. At the time that Lynch was advising Orban, she was a William L. Clayton Professor of International Economic Affairs at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

In 2004-2009, Lynch was a Director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and became the chair of the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston between 2007-2009. Additionally, in 2009, Lynch became a Chair of the Conference of Chairmen of the Federal Reserve System. Lynch would go on to become a member of the Economic Advisory Panel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 2018-2024. Currently, she is the 2025-2026 Stone Visiting Scholar and Visiting Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Dr. William C. Martel was the third advisor to join Anita Orban’s dissertation committee. In addition to working as a Professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, Martel was a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College. He was also the Director of the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College.

According to a biography associated with Martel’s academic work, he “directed a number of studies on space and policy issues for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the U.S. Air Force, and the Office of Secretary of Defense.” The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is the agency within the Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense) that tests new military technology and is known for pushing ethical boundaries.

In 2006, Martel’s review of a previous work titled, “The E-Bomb: How America’s New Directed Energy Weapons Will Change the Way Future Wars Will Be Fought” by Doug Beason was published in the Naval War College Review. The original work examines the future use of directed-energy technologies in warfare.

Martel authored and edited several written works including The Technological Arsenal: Emerging Defense Capabilities, published in May 2001. According to an Amazon summary of the book, Martel and the expert contributors “describe the development, analyze the capabilities, and measure the implications of emerging technologies that will mature within the next five years and beyond, organizing them in three broad categories: directed energy, targeting, and command and control.” The book does not advocate for any particular program, however each chapter reviews a technology already approved or funded by U.S. Congress. A review of the book was published in Foreign Affairs Magazine on September 1, 2001.

Beyond academics and research, Martel was a professional staff member at the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. He had experience in shaping foreign policy, serving as an advisor to the National Security Council between 2008-2010. He was also a Senior Foreign Policy advisor to then-Governor Mitt Romney during his 2012 Presidential Campaign. According to a former colleague, who worked with Martel on Romney’s foreign policy team, it was Martel who advised then-Governor Romney on Russia and “helped formulate the position that Russia was a geostrategic threat.”

Anita Orban shared the following about Dr. William C. Martel in her dissertation acknowledge section, “I am thankful for Professor Martel for joining my committee at a later stage and offering all his time to make me finish as planned. Professor Martel’s comments made me sharpen the argument and were also essential in polishing the dissertation’s style and language.”

At the conclusion of Anita Orban’s dissertation, the bibliography section includes her interviews, regular consultations, references and works cited. In the “Author’s interviews” section it lists former CIA Director James Woolsey. The reference indicates that Orban interviewed Woolsey in Washington D.C. in October 2000.

Woolsey served as head of the CIA from 1993-1995 during the Clinton Administration, and he previously held positions in the Carter, Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations. Woolsey also served as Ambassador to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe from 1989 to 1991.

For the purposes of Orban’s dissertation, she may have met with Woolsey due to his experience in energy security. Woolsey served as a chair member of the United States Energy Security Council. According to the State Department’s profile featuring Woolsey, in July 2002, he joined Booz Allen Hamilton as the Vice President of the Global Strategic Security division. The following month in August 2002, he became a distinguished advisor for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a research institute focused on national security and foreign policy, which was established shortly after September 11, 2001.

Cold War Propagandists Make a Comeback

Another notable reference in Anita Orban’s bibliography can be found in the “Regular consultations” section, which lists historian Richard Pipes. The reference indicates Anita Orban corresponded with Richard Pipes via email and that the two met twice, once in Budapest and once in Boston, between 2003-2004.

Richard Pipes was a history professor at Harvard University with a specialization in Russia and the Soviet Union. He authored many books on the subject and spent the majority of his career in academia from 1958 until his retirement in 1996. Pipes, who was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, held prominent positions as a foreign policy advisor to U.S. Presidents, and more broadly, the U.S. Intelligence Community.

In the early 1980s, Pipes took a brief leave of absence from Harvard to serve on the National Security Council under the Reagan Administration from 1981-1982. In this role, Pipes advised the Administration on its policy toward the Soviet Union, and he was the primary author of two National Security Decision Directives, including the NSDD-32 and NSDD-75. Put simply, both directives increased U.S. aggression toward the Soviet Union and became fundamental components of the Reagan Doctrine, which was a foreign policy initiative aimed at supporting anti-communist rebels.

Pipes is arguably most well-known for his effort leading the 1976 Team B exercise. Team B, consisted of a group of military analysts and experts, who were tasked with assessing the CIA’s 1975 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet Strategic Objectives. Team B was created by the then-CIA Director George H.W. Bush.

In its assessment, Team B determined that the CIA underestimated the threat of the Soviet Union. According to the Team B Intelligence Report, “Team B feels the USSR strives for effective strategic superiority in all the branches of the military, nuclear forces included… Their military doctrine is measured not in Western terms of assured destruction but in those of a war-fighting and war-winning capability.” Put simply, Team B argued the Soviets did not view nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

Today, assessments of the Team B Intelligence Report indicate that Team B exaggerated the threat of the Soviet Union and relied on the perceived ideological motives of the Soviets rather than observable and measurable data. Years later, Richard Pipes would continue to perpetuate and uphold the Team B findings, emphasizing the importance of understanding the Soviet and Russian mindset.

In an interview from around 2009, presumably in affiliation with The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation, when asked what he would change to improve the CIA’s effectiveness, Pipes responded that it would be to change their understanding of the Soviet/Russian mindset (throughout the interview Pipes often uses “Soviet” and “Russian” interchangeably). Pipes remarked that CIA officials and graduates of American universities, in general, have difficulty understanding the Soviet mentality.

“They assume basically we’re all the same, and they think pretty much the same way that we do,” Pipes said. “And I had great difficulty persuading them of it… that the Russians think differently.” Pipes said President Reagan, in particular, had a hard time grappling with the idea that the Soviet/Russian leadership did not want the Russian people to be prosper but preferred them to be weak and poor, according to Pipes. “And because he (Reagan) was a nice man, he couldn’t understand that leaders would not want the well-being of their people.”

One could argue that Pipes’ focus on persuading the U.S. leadership that the Soviet/Russian mindset is fundamentally different from those in the West, is a tactic that could lead to the dehumanization of an entire group. Furthermore, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pipes’ negative perspective on the Russians extended beyond the leadership to the general population as well.

In the 2009 interview, Pipes argued that given the Russian population’s current support for the leadership, all Russians must share a similar mindset to those within the government. Pipes went on to reference an article he wrote in Foreign Affairs Magazine several years earlier, in 2004, titled, Flight From Freedom. Pipes stated that “it (his article) showed that the (Russian) population thinks very much the way the government does — that freedom is not important, that what is important is order and security, that the West is hostile, and so on.”

Thus, during the early 2000s, at the time when Richard Pipes was corresponding and meeting with Anita Orban for her doctoral dissertation, he held negative, and arguably prejudicial, views on Russians. This is evidenced in his previously referenced comments as well as a report covering his 2005 Pew Memorial Lecture at Grove City College, in which he argued that Russia was not a democracy but an autocracy. At the time, he also shared that he did not have much hope for the country’s future.

One must now consider if and how Pipes may have influenced Anita Orban’s perspective on Russia and the Russian people, and how this could impact her strategy and decision-making as Foreign Minister of Hungary.

Mentored by a Bohemian Grove and Bilderberg Attendee

Aside from Pipes’ academic and professional work, his social affiliations raised serious questions. In a 2003 CSPAN interview with Brian Lamb, Richard Pipes confirmed he attended the Bohemian Grove, a controversial secret gathering which included former U.S. Presidents Reagan and Bush as well as military officials, businessmen and others among the powerful elite. Without shame, Pipes shared that the Bohemian Grove is, in fact, an exclusive gentlemen’s club and that he was invited to attend by a friend.

When asked for more details, Pipes confirmed he was invited after he served as an Advisor on the National Security Council. Pipes also disclosed that he attended two Bilderberg meetings and met Henry Kissinger at one of them. Pipes reflected on this, and it appeared the two had a contentious, or perhaps rivalrous, relationship.

And despite this publicly confirmed association between Pipes and secret organizations, Anita Orban would continue to maintain a working relationship with Pipes. In fairness, others in Anita Orban’s circle, not just Pipes, had strong connections to elite societies, including some members of the Bush family. Furthermore, Pipes would continue to be revered by some political factions despite this controversy and despite the inaccurate Team B assessment report.

Anita Orban’s Career Post Ph.D. (2007-2010)

Anita Orban eventually earned her Ph.D. in 2007. During this time, she and her then-husband, Krisztian Orban, had been living in Budapest for several years after moving back from the U.S. in 2002. Anita Orban was serving as the Deputy Director of the International Centre for Democratic Transition. According to an archived website, the organization’s purpose was “to collect and share the experiences of past democratic transitions.” George Herbert Walker, the first cousin of former President George W. Bush, and Donald Blinken, the father of former Secretary of State Antony Blinken, were among the international board members. Both men previously served as U.S. Ambassadors to Hungary.

It is important to note that at this time, in 2007, Anita was still married to Krisztian Orban. It is unclear when the couple divorced, but based on reports, it appears they were still married until at least 2010.

Around 2007, one can reasonably assume that the two shared a very close professional bond as evidenced in Anita Orban’s acknowledgment section of her Ph.D. dissertation in which she gives an extensive thanks to her then-husband Krisztian.

Business Ventures with the American Elite

In 2007, Krisztian Orban, co-founded the company, Oriens, which is involved in the acquisition of medium-sized companies and then expands them to become larger, successful businesses. Oriens’ website states that they “de-bottleneck” these companies and “facilitate their fast growth.” The website goes on to state, “We own nine companies, all of which are considerably bigger than upon acquisition. We are also proud that all of the original owners are happy with the development of their former company.”

During Oriens’ early foundation, it relied on the immeasurable support of Ambassador George Herbert Walker and the moral and financial support from Peter Holtzer and the advice of John C. Whitehead.

John C. Whitehead was a prominent individual within the U.S. Establishment. He was a banker, who worked with Goldman Sachs, and he was a chairman with The Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Following September 11, 2001, he was appointed by then-Governor of New York George Pataki to chair the board of the Lower Manhattan Development Project. He was also a chairman of the World Trade Center Memorial Foundation.

Hungary Foundation, an organization focused on fostering American-Hungarian relations, published a tribute in honor of John C. Whitehead when he passed away, which referenced his support for many pro-Hungary initiatives. The tribute included that “While at Goldman Sachs, Mr. Whitehead traveled to Vienna in 1956, just as the revolution in Hungary broke out. He was deeply affected by the plight of Hungary’s freedom fighters and took significant measures to assist them.”

An article in the Hungarian press from 2009 reported that Oriens’ launched a venture capital fund with Bush’s cousin as well as George Pataki, the former Governor of New York. Thus, while a clear business connection among Whitehead, Ambassador Walker and Krisztian Orban can be established, Anita Orban seems to have her own connection to the Bush family, either through her then-husband or through her own affiliations.

The above photo shows Anita Orban sitting next to former President George H.W. Bush (Bush Sr.) at what appears to be Walker’s Point Estate in Maine in the 2000s. However, the exact date and location of this photo is not yet confirmed. The picture was included in an interview between Anita Orban and Peter Magyar published in early 2026. And while little is known about this photo, it provides further evidence of Anita Orban’s connection to the American Elite.

American Friends Leave an Impression

Around 2003, Anita Orban published a book titled, The impact of anti-communism on U.S. conservatism. The book was published in Hungarian and focuses on anti-communist ideology and its impact on the neoconservative movement in America. The book features the election and Presidency of Ronald Reagan. And interestingly, John C. Whitehead served in the Reagan Administration as Deputy Secretary of State, making him the fourth individual (referenced here, there may be more) connected to Anita Orban who worked under Reagan. (The other three previously mentioned include Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., the chair of Anita Orban’s dissertation committee, Richard Pipes, whom she consulted with for her doctoral dissertation and former CIA Director James Woolsey, whom she interviewed for her dissertation.)

In 2008, Anita Orban wrote another book, Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism, which was published in the United States. The book advocates for the European Union (EU) Member States’ adoption of a centralized policy toward Russia. It also argues in favor of Hungary moving away from reliance on Russian energy. In the acknowledgment section of the book, Orban credits her former boss, Dr. Ariel Cohen, for being the first person to encourage her to study Russian energy policy in Central Europe. Presumably, Cohen was Orban’s boss while she was working at the Heritage Foundation in the summer 2000 as he was a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation until July 2014. Cohen is an internationally-recognized energy policy expert, who has worked with various U.S. Government institutions including the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department and others.

Anita Orban and Ariel Cohen have remained in contact in recent years. In 2022, Orban posted to LinkedIn a photo of herself, stating that she was proud to be a part of the Vodafone Digital Award. Cohen left a comment on the post, which read, “Congrats! And you look great! 👌🏽”

Orban’s 2008 book received endorsements from U.S. Ambassador Walker and Robert Kagan — a former State Department official during the Reagan Administration and the husband of Victoria Nuland. The other notable review came from Anita Orban’s former advisor, Richard Pipes, who said, “Anita Orban has written a pioneering study of the way the government of Russia uses its energy resources as an instrument of foreign policy. This strategy presents many dangers to the West, and she also suggests ways of neutralizing it.”

It is important to remember that by at least 2003, Pipes’ attendance at the Bohemian Grove and Bilderberg, was public knowledge following the CSPAN interview in which he admitted to these affiliations. Despite this, Orban continued to associate with Pipes as evidenced in his review of her 2008 book.

In 2010, Anita Orban was nominated as a Fidesz candidate for the National Assembly. However, she withdrew her nomination rather abruptly citing health reasons. The withdrawal of her candidacy coincided with reports that her then-husband’s former company was under investigation by the police. This left many to question her official reason for withdrawing her candidacy. Yet, despite this short-lived political run, and the controversy and speculation that followed, it would be of little consequence to her overall career.

Lobbying and Applauding the U.S. Leadership

Between 2010-2015, Anita Orban served as Ambassador-at-Large for Energy Security representing Hungary. In her role as Ambassador, in March 2014, Anita Orban testified before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Energy and Power. She was one of several experts to speak before the Subcommittee during a hearing on House Resolution 6 (H.R. 6) titled, Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act. The Resolution was introduced by then-Republican Representative Cory Gardner.

During his opening statement, then-Rep. Gardner stated that the bill “grants approval for completed LNG (liquified natural gas) export applications that are currently languishing at the Department of Energy and would modify the standard of review for future export applications by shifting the benchmark from Free Trade Agreement (FTA) countries to World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries.” To put it simply, the proposal would make it easier and quicker for the U.S. to export LNG to more countries.

Rep. Gardner also commented on the current geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe, through his perspective, and argued the perceived geopolitical benefits of H.R. 6, stating, “the near monopolistic control Russia has on the LNG market in Europe has given them immense power, and reforming the LNG export process would send an immediate signal to the rest of the world that would help check Russia’s aggression.” On the following day of the hearing, Rep. Gardner remarked that “opposing this legislation is like hanging up on a 911 call (112 emergency) from our friends and allies.”

Furthermore, Rep. Gardner advocated for U.S. energy independence and argued that it was possible for the U.S. to be self-reliant while also exporting LNG to other countries. In another reference to the perceived geopolitical advantage of his proposal, Rep. Gardner claimed that “energy produced here at home and sent overseas means we are sending energy and not our troops.”

Reiterating the same sentiment, Anita Orban delivered her testimony, arguing in favor of the proposal. She began by stating, “We applaud the leadership.” This was in reference to the relevant American congressional officials who proposed and advocated for the Resolution. Orban then shared that “On March 6, four Ambassadors of the four Visegrad countries signed a letter to Speaker Boehner and Majority Leader Harry Reid to urge them to recognize the overall importance of U.S. engagement in Central/Eastern Europe, and more specifically, in the area of energy security.”

In continuing her plea to encourage U.S. Congress to support the Resolution, Orban claimed that providing LNG helps Ukraine and sends a strong geopolitical signal. She emphasized, “There is nothing like a crisis to focus the mind. As Representatives of a country that Central/Eastern Europe has traditionally looked to for leadership, you know well that you do not always have the luxury of choosing the time to make some of the most necessary decisions. But with the post-Cold War settlement crumbling before our eyes, if there was ever a time for your leadership, it is now.”

Following Anita Orban’s testimony, she secured a meeting with then-Speaker of the House John Boehner. According to the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Boehner said to Orban, “I hope he (then-President Barack Obama) uses this as an opportunity to discuss how we can help the Europeans reduce their dependence on Vladimir Putin. Expediting the approval of US natural gas exports would send a clear signal that Russia's energy stranglehold on Europe will not continue… The best way we can help them is to circumvent their vulnerability by meeting their energy needs.”

H.R. 6 passed the House in June 2014. It was received in the Senate but did not progress further through the legislative process. In 2015, Anita Orban left her position as Ambassador for Energy Security and entered the private sector, where she would work for several years, including as a Chief Advisor for Cheniere Marketing and as Vice President for International Affairs with Tellurian LNG from 2017-2020.

Emerging Interests, Telecommunications and Digitization

In recent years, Anita Orban worked as the External Affairs Director of Vodafone Hungary beginning January 2021. During this time, and until very recently, Orban served on the Board of Directors of Globesec, a think tank focused on security and sustainability, with offices in several European cities as well as in Washington, D.C. and Kiev. Globesec is partnered with organizations such as Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Lockheed Martin and others. Throughout the years, Orban has spoken at several Atlantic Council Forums.

Her recent commentary on security, however, may indicate she has an inclination to favor digitization initiatives in Europe. In a 20 questions-style video published on Dec. 7, 2025, Anita Orban shared her current and long-term goals. At the time of the interview, she stated that she was working as Director for Public Affairs and ESG at Vodafone Global. She also revealed that she is building upon her “leadership skills.”

When asked by the interviewer what keeps her up at night about her work, Orban responded, “digital security and safety.” The interviewer followed up by asking how she is tackling it, and Orban responded, “working with governments to have a proper framework.” When asked what her five-year ambition is, Orban said, “(to) create a healthy digital ecosystem in Europe.”

In January 2026, Anita Orban officially joined the TISZA Party and was announced as the party’s lead foreign policy advisor. On April 12, 2026, the TISZA Party won the Hungarian elections with a super majority, and she was subsequently nominated as Foreign Minister. Shortly after the election, Orban was already traveling with then-Prime Minister-elect Peter Magyar to Brussels and Italy.

All of this, in addition to Anita Orban’s International Security and Diplomacy education in the U.S., her work experience with various think tanks in Washington, D.C., her apprehension toward Russia, her advocacy for LNG and her support for European unification would likely make her Brussels’ potential top choice for Prime Minister of Hungary.

One could argue that Prime Minister Peter Magyar ought to stop worrying about Fidesz, President Tamás Sulyok and Viktor Orban, and instead, be very concerned about a different Orban, Anita Orban, who, with the support of the entire Western Establishment, may be all too willing to replace him as Prime Minister.

Making Sense of an Unrelatable History

While Anita Orban’s connections to the U.S. Establishment, military and national security state are significant, it is important to reiterate that this is not to suggest that Anita Orban is a mirror of each mentor, professor, friend or advisor who has had an impact on her life. The point is not to place attributions based on association, but instead, to recognize a pattern.

Anita Orban was educated, mentored and advised by prominent members within the U.S. national security and military communities, who held professional affiliations with DARPA, Council on Foreign Relations, the RAND Corporation and the Federal Reserve. These contacts were at the prime of their careers before, during and after September 11, 2001. This moment in history marked the rapid global acceleration of the national security, pro-military and pro-war industries, of which Anita Orban may very possibly be a part of.

From being mentored by a Bohemian Grove and Bilderberg attendee and educated by foreign policy advisors to the highest-ranking officials within the U.S. Government, to then serving as Ambassador for Energy Security and imploring U.S. Congress to intervene in a conflict between Russia and Ukraine by entering the Eastern European energy market, to then advocating for cooperation with the centralized power structure that is the European Union, all while vowing to take a more aggressive approach toward Russia, it would be fair to say Anita Orban is likely doing exactly what she was trained, expected and activated to do in this very moment — fulfill Western interests and push Hungary toward centralization. But with awareness, vigilance and a peaceful yet determined spirit, the people of Hungary can still reverse this trajectory and preserve what is most valuable — their sovereignty.

Crypto pioneer and entrepreneur Roger Ver is well known as one of the first crypto investors in the world. As an early advocate of Bitcoin, Ver obtained the moniker “Bitcoin Jesus” for his promotion of and enthusiasm for what was, in 2011, a new technology.

Beginning at a young age, Ver developed a deep interest in economics and understood early on the importance of freedom of transaction and decentralization. For him, personal sovereignty, non-interventionism, and limited government were essential for America’s success. Thus, at only 21 years old, eager to share these ideas with others and initiate positive change, Ver ambitiously entered the political scene in the state of California as a libertarian. He used the opportunity to raise awareness of the corruption of law enforcement and the intelligence agencies while advocating for an end to mass killing and war.

Like many others who expose government wrongdoing, Ver faced serious retaliation from selective prosecution to repeated Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits. Left with no other option, Ver made the difficult decision to expatriate from the United States in 2014. Despite this, Ver, who has a natural entrepreneurial drive, persevered and grew his businesses into successful international companies. Meanwhile, he continued to strongly advocate for Bitcoin and decentralized systems while assisting various humanitarian causes around the world. By 2024, things were looking up for Roger Ver until his life took a shocking and dramatic turn. [Note: Interested readers can skip to the detailed Case Timeline here.]

The case against Roger Ver

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has charged Ver,¹ in the Central District of California, with three counts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, two counts of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and three counts of making fraudulent or false statements under penalties of perjury under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). The charges are related to the preparing, mailing, and filing of his 2014 and 2017 non-resident alien income tax returns (1040NR), a 2016 gift tax return (Form 709), and his 2014 exit tax return (Form 8854). The allegations against Ver stem from activity from more than a decade ago, beginning in 2014 with Ver’s expatriation from the United States through 2018. Central to the case is a dispute on the valuation and ownership of an amount of bitcoin in 2014. If extradited, tried, and convicted, Ver faces 109 years in prison. Three charges of mail fraud—physically placing the alleged false documents in the mail—account for 90 of the 109 years.

While preparing, mailing, and filing his tax returns, Ver relied on an expert team of lawyers and tax advisors, including former federal prosecutors and former IRS agents. Ver maintains that he acted in accordance with the advice given to him by his legal counsel and that he is not guilty of the accusations against him. For years, Ver had always been clear: he was willing to pay the amount of tax owed. However, instead of informing Ver of what he owed, the U.S. government launched a criminal case against him, which the defense argues is based on selective quotation, a violation of Ver’s attorney-client privilege, and a number of other legal irregularities dating back to a time in which there was little to no guidance from the IRS on how to treat cryptocurrency (and when most bitcoin owners were not filing taxes on cryptocurrency at all). The accusations against Roger Ver should be understood in this context.

For clarity, Table 1 outlines each count against Ver and the corresponding dates and activity. Note that the information provided in the table is based on the indictment.² MemoryDealers and Agilestar were Ver’s U.S.-based companies, for which he had to value and calculate the gains on their hypothetical sale as part of the exit tax for his expatriation. Given that Ver’s companies remained domiciled in the U.S. post-expatriation, he was still subject to U.S. tax on distributions and dividends received from those companies.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has charged Ver,¹ in the Central District of California, with three counts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, two counts of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and three counts of making fraudulent or false statements under penalties of perjury under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). The charges are related to the preparing, mailing, and filing of his 2014 and 2017 non-resident alien income tax returns (1040NR), a 2016 gift tax return (Form 709), and his 2014 exit tax return (Form 8854). The allegations against Ver stem from activity from more than a decade ago, beginning in 2014 with Ver’s expatriation from the United States through 2018. Central to the case is a dispute on the valuation and ownership of an amount of bitcoin in 2014. If extradited, tried, and convicted, Ver faces 109 years in prison. Three charges of mail fraud—physically placing the alleged false documents in the mail—account for 90 of the 109 years.

While preparing, mailing, and filing his tax returns, Ver relied on an expert team of lawyers and tax advisors, including former federal prosecutors and former IRS agents. Ver maintains that he acted in accordance with the advice given to him by his legal counsel and that he is not guilty of the accusations against him. For years, Ver had always been clear: he was willing to pay the amount of tax owed. However, instead of informing Ver of what he owed, the U.S. government launched a criminal case against him, which the defense argues is based on selective quotation, a violation of Ver’s attorney-client privilege, and a number of other legal irregularities dating back to a time in which there was little to no guidance from the IRS on how to treat cryptocurrency (and when most bitcoin owners were not filing taxes on cryptocurrency at all). The accusations against Roger Ver should be understood in this context.

For clarity, Table 1 outlines each count against Ver and the corresponding dates and activity. Note that the information provided in the table is based on the indictment.² MemoryDealers and Agilestar were Ver’s U.S.-based companies, for which he had to value and calculate the gains on their hypothetical sale as part of the exit tax for his expatriation. Given that Ver’s companies remained domiciled in the U.S. post-expatriation, he was still subject to U.S. tax on distributions and dividends received from those companies.

On December 3, 2024, Ver’s defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss counts one through eight of the indictment,³ citing the unconstitutionality of the exit tax, the government’s reliance on selective quotation presented to the grand jury, and the vague statutory foundations and lack of regulatory clarity on the tax treatment of cryptocurrency, which forms the basis of the government’s case. Attached to the filing were Exhibits 1-14, which include email communications among Ver and the members of his legal and tax counsel, spanning a period from 2012 to 2018. The defense argues these communications, when understood in full, decimate the accusations that Ver acted willfully to violate U.S. tax law (see case timeline for details).

An Armed Raid, Violation of DOJ Protocol

Additionally, in its motion to dismiss, the defense argues that during the course of the investigation into Ver, special agents of the IRS Criminal Investigation Division violated Ver’s attorney-client privilege when they conducted an unannounced raid on his tax counsel and engaged in an interview with one of Ver’s attorneys prior to issuing subpoenas in December 2017.

According to the defense, “Department policy requires significant scrutiny by Department supervisors and safeguards against abuse prior to the questioning of a subject’s attorney or the service of compelled process on an attorney (Justice Manual § 9- 13.410).” The defense further argues that the interrogation “prior to the service of compelled process” indicates this investigative technique likely does not adhere to official Department policy.

Furthermore, following the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to Ver’s tax counsel, a legal dispute ensued over access to Ver’s privileged communications. The dispute went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court in a case called In re Grand Jury.⁴ After hearing oral arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the case, thus granting the IRS access to Ver’s privileged communications in 2023.

Legal Experts Weigh In

With Roger Ver’s prominence as a businessman, author, and philanthropist,⁵ his case has garnered much attention from the crypto community and the public at large, including professionals in the field of tax law. American international tax lawyer Attorney Anthony Parent,⁶ who has been following the case and has extensive experience assisting clients with expatriation and filing Form 8854, says Roger Ver and his legal team did everything correctly.⁷ “I have sympathy for the law firm because they did everything right and they went through everything the way I would go through it,” said Attorney Parent. “This is totally a political indictment.”

Criminal tax lawyer Attorney Robert Barnes⁸ has been particularly vocal about the U.S. government’s deviation from the proper protocols in its pursuit of Ver. “Normal procedure is to go through civil collections first, not rush to criminal prosecution,” said Attorney Barnes. “Normal procedure is to tell someone how much tax they believe is due, not hide it from the individual even when he asks for an amount” (as Ver repeatedly did with no answer).

Reiterating a similar sentiment, Attorney Parent says this case may not really be about taxes but rather fear and intimidation, especially to prevent people from expatriating. “The government looks at people who are expatriating as ‘we’re going to lose out on those estate taxes’ and so essentially the exit tax is a stand-in for the estate tax because from the government’s perspective they are going to lose you once you expatriate.”

Some may be left to now wonder, how complicated is the expatriation process? And why would someone like Roger Ver choose to expatriate from the United States in the first place? Although only Ver himself can answer such a question, he has previously expressed that the decision was a difficult one⁹ and that America will always be “near and dear to [his] heart.” However, like for many others, it was a decision based on the realization that he had no other choice.

The Expatriation Process

[Author’s note: This section is a simplified explanation of the expatriation procedure and its tax implications. For more detailed analyses, visit the work of Attorney John Richardson,¹⁰ who contributed to this section. ]

The 14th Amendment¹¹ makes clear that an individual born or naturalized in the United States is a U.S. citizen. However, the 14th Amendment speaks only to which individuals have a constitutional right to U.S. citizenship; it does not address whether or how U.S. citizenship can be relinquished.

U.S. citizens can relinquish their citizenship in a process called expatriation. It is important to understand expatriation as an immigration and citizenship issue that may trigger significant tax implications. The immigration-related procedure of expatriation is governed under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),¹² whereas the tax implications that may follow expatriation are separately governed under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).

INA Section 349A lists seven possible expatriating or relinquishing acts that may potentially result in the loss of U.S. citizenship:

(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application or upon an application filed by a duly authorized agent, after having attained the age of eighteen years; or 

(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years; or 

(3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer; or 

(4) (A) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after attaining the age of eighteen years if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state; or (B) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after attaining the age of eighteen years for which office, post, or employment an oath, affirmation, or declaration of allegiance is required; or 

(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State; or 

(6) making in the United States a formal written renunciation of nationality in such form as may be prescribed by, and before such officer as may be designated by, the Attorney General, whenever the United States shall be in a state of war and the Attorney General shall approve such renunciation as not contrary to the interests of national defense; or 

(7) committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States, violating or conspiring to violate any of the provisions of section 2383 of title 18, or willfully performing any act in violation of section 2385 of title 18, or violating section 2384 of title 18 by engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, if and when he is convicted thereof by a court martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction. 

The first four actions occur outside a U.S. Consulate. The fifth form of relinquishment, “renunciation,” takes place inside a U.S. Consulate under the direction of a U.S. Consular Officer. The sixth and seventh acts are beyond the scope of this article.

Note that the statute speaks of “relinquishing” U.S. citizenship. “Renunciation” is one of seven forms of relinquishment. Taking the oath of renunciation is one of seven expatriating acts that results in the relinquishment of U.S. citizenship. Often, renunciation and relinquishment are used interchangeably, but this is incorrect. One may relinquish U.S. citizenship without renouncing U.S. citizenship. That said, a renunciation of U.S. citizenship is a relinquishment of U.S. citizenship. Additionally, taking an oath of renunciation may have its own immigration-related consequences. (Note: The 1996 Reed Amendment may prohibit some expatriates from re-entering the United States if the individual took an oath of renunciation of U.S. citizenship for tax avoidance purposes.¹³)

Thus, if one voluntarily commits any one of the above acts with the specific intention of relinquishing U.S. citizenship, the individual may seek a Certificate of Loss of Nationality (CLN) from the U.S. State Department. This request is supported by submitting a signed Request for a Determination of Possible Loss of Citizenship (Form DS-4079) to a U.S. Embassy or Consulate. The request for a CLN takes place in the context of an interview. If the request is approved, the U.S. Government will issue a CLN, and the individual will cease to be a U.S. citizen for immigration purposes under the INA. (Note that the process of “renouncing U.S. citizenship,” because it takes place under the direction of a U.S. Consular Officer, is an automatic request for a CLN.) 

Roger Ver, after voluntarily naturalizing as a citizen of St. Kitts and Nevis on February 4, 2014, formally requested a CLN at the U.S. Consulate in Barbados on March 3, 2014.

While the court documents do not provide sufficient clarity, Ver’s claim for a CLN appears to have been based on INA 349(a)(1):

“[O]btaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application or upon an application filed by a duly authorized agent, after having attained the age of eighteen years.”

In other words, Ver’s naturalization as a St. Kitts and Nevis citizen was the expatriating act that led to Ver’s relinquishment of U.S. citizenship. However, naturalizing as a citizen of St. Kitts and Nevis is a relinquishing act only under the INA and thus only impacts Ver’s citizenship/immigration status. It did not terminate his status as a U.S. taxpayer.

This is confirmed by 7701(a)(50) of the IRC¹⁴:

(50) Termination of United States citizenship

(A) In general 
An individual shall not cease to be treated as a United States citizen before the date on which the individual’s citizenship is treated as relinquished under section 877A(g)(4).

This means that Ver still had to meet separate and additional notification requirements in 877A(g)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to ensure he was no longer treated as a U.S. citizen for the purposes of U.S. taxation, reporting, and penalties.

To reiterate, committing one of the seven expatriating acts results in the relinquishment of U.S. citizenship for immigration and nationality purposes. The subsequent receipt of a CLN is proof that the U.S. government has been notified of and accepts the relinquishment of citizenship under the Immigration and Nationality Act. According to the IRC, as shown above, the individual shall continue to be treated as a U.S. citizen for U.S. tax purposes until his or her citizenship is considered relinquished under Internal Revenue Code 877A(g)(4). (This point will be revisited in greater detail in the context of Ver’s case.)

A Brief History of Relinquishment and and Taxation

Throughout most of U.S. history, U.S. citizenship has been tied to taxation. The United States is one of only two countries in the world that employ citizenship-based taxation.¹⁵ Under the U.S. citizenship taxation regime, U.S. citizens are subject to U.S. taxation on their worldwide income wherever they live in the world and wherever the source of the income. U.S. residents are also subject to U.S. taxation on their worldwide income. Green card holders are subject to the same rules. Today, U.S. citizens (and residents, including green card holders) living outside the United States are required to file and may owe U.S. tax on their worldwide income. The only way to avoid this is to relinquish U.S. citizenship or abandon one’s green card.

Since 1966,¹⁶ there have been tax consequences for expatriation with the establishment of IRC Section 877 by the Foreign Investors Tax Act.¹⁷ However, the rules have evolved since then. This section focuses on two specific periods which are relevant to Ver’s situation.

Expatriation: June 3, 2004 – June 16, 2008

The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004¹⁸ amended sections 877 and 6039G of the Internal Revenue Code, which defined the expatriation tax and reporting rules. Amended Section 877 imposed an “alternative tax regime” on some expatriated individuals.¹⁹ Amended Section 6039G imposed additional reporting requirements for all expatriating individuals each year they are subject to Section 877. The new policies were effective from June 3, 2004, and remained in effect until June 16, 2008.

Prior to June 3, 2004, expatriation for tax purposes followed expatriation for immigration purposes. Thus, citizenship for purposes of U.S. taxation was based on citizenship for immigration/nationality. The Internal Revenue Code determination of one’s citizenship for the purposes of U.S. taxation was based only on immigration/citizenship law.

However, this changed with the implementation of IRC 7701(n) found in section 804 of the AJCA 2004.

‘‘(n) SPECIAL RULES FOR DETERMINING WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL IS NO LONGER A UNITED STATES CITIZEN OR LONG-TERM RESIDENT.—An individual who would (but for this subsection) cease to be treated as a citizen or resident of the United States shall continue to be treated as a citizen or resident of the United States, as the case may be, until such individual—
‘(1) gives notice of an expatriating act or termination of residency (with the requisite intent to relinquish citizenship or terminate residency) to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
‘(2) provides a statement in accordance with section 6039G.’’

IRC 7701(n) effectively created the “tax citizen.” As an expatriation lawyer specializing in citizenship renunciation and green card abandonment, Attorney John Richardson has described the practical impact of the new 7701(n) as creating dual U.S. citizenship for all U.S. citizens:

“All of a sudden, all Americans got dual citizenship. You were a citizen for immigration purposes, and because it’s the greatest, best citizenship of all [irony], you get a new form of citizenship called tax citizenship.”

IRC 7701(n) required an expatriated individual to continue to be treated as a U.S. citizen for tax purposes (meaning taxes, reporting, and penalties continue) until he or she separately notified the IRS of his or her expatriation by filing Form 8854 (Initial and Annual Expatriation Statement). (The same conditions applied for noncitizen long-term residents of the United States, or green card holders. Until filing Form 8854 and notifying the Department of Homeland Security of termination of U.S. residency, former noncitizen long-term residents would still be treated as U.S. residents for tax purposes.) Form 8854 requires a relinquisher to disclose all property, assets, and worldwide income as well as certify tax compliance for the five years prior to expatriation. As John Richardson has remarked:

“And they should have had ads all over the country on billboards saying, ‘Coming June 3, 2004! The more abusive form of U.S. Citizenship!’” 

During this time period, in a sense, one had to relinquish U.S. citizenship twice in order to avoid tax obligations—once for immigration purposes with the State Department (DS-4079) and then again for tax purposes with the IRS by filing Form 8854. Says Richardson:

“You could lose your U.S. citizenship for immigration purposes and never be allowed in the United States. They can tell you, ‘Get lost. Get back on the plane. We’ll send you back in cargo. We care so little about you.’ But what they do care about is this—that by God, you keep filing U.S. tax returns as a U.S. resident until you submit that 8854!”

Therefore, in summary, beginning June 3, 2004, and continuing today, regardless of one’s status as a U.S. citizen under U.S. immigration law, one may still be treated as a U.S. citizen for tax purposes. Determining citizenship for tax purposes is different from determining citizenship for immigration/nationality purposes.

Expatriation: June 17, 2008 to present

In 2008, the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax (HEART) Act repealed the AJCA 2004.²⁰ Section 301²¹ of the HEART Act made three changes to the expatriation process:

1. First, it added Section 877A to the IRC, which imposed an exit tax on “covered expatriates” who relinquished U.S. citizenship on or after June 17, 2008. 

2. Second, it added Section 2801 to the IRC, which made the recipients of gifts or bequests from “covered expatriates” subject to a tax on receipt of the gift or bequest.

3. Third, it removed the requirement of filing Form 8854 as a condition to ending treatment as a U.S. citizen for tax purposes. In simple terms (as long as a CLN was issued), one ceased to be treated as a U.S. citizen for tax purposes on the date of the renunciation appointment at the U.S. Consulate.

An individual is a “covered expatriate” and thus subject to the Section 877A rules and the 2801 “covered gift” rules if he or she meets any one of the following three criteria:

• An average annual net income tax greater than $205,000 (adjusted for inflation annually) for the five years prior to expatriation, or 

• A net worth of $2 million or more on the date of expatriation, or 

• Failure to complete Form 8854 and/or failure to confirm tax compliance for the five years prior to the date of expatriation 

Given that Ver had a net worth of more than $2 million on the date of expatriation in 2014, he was considered a “covered expatriate” and thus subject to both the 877A Exit Tax and 2801 “Covered Gift” rules.

It is important to note that all expatriates, regardless of status, are required to complete and file Form 8854 in order to avoid “covered expatriate” status. This is because Form 8854 is where the IRS requires that one certify the five years of tax compliance. Failure to complete Form 8854 results in a $10,000 penalty (in addition to “covered expatriate” status). However, unlike the policy from June 3, 2004, to June 16, 2008, failure to complete Form 8854 does not result in one continuing to be treated as a U.S. citizen for tax purposes.

The primary impact of the June 16, 2008, legislation is that “covered expatriate” status (subject to minor exceptions) has the effects of (1) making the person subject to the 877A exit tax rules and (2) making the person’s heirs subject to the 2801 “covered gift” rules.

The Cost of Being Rich

For nearly 60 years, the United States has imposed a tax on certain expatriating individuals, but it was not until 2008 that the “exit tax” was imposed. The “exit tax” is a collection of different types of taxes triggered by relinquishment of U.S. citizenship or abandonment of the green card. It includes (but is not limited to) a tax based on a “deemed” (not actual) sale of property on the date prior to expatriation.

In Section 877A, for the purposes of calculating the exit tax, “covered expatriates” are deemed to have sold all of their property on the day before expatriation for its fair market value. For example, if one’s date of expatriation for tax purposes under IRC 877A(g)(4) was April 30, 2025, he or she would calculate the hypothetical sale of all property as of April 29, 2025. Any gain or loss arising from that hypothetical sale shall be taken into account for that taxable year prior to expatriation. Thus, the exit tax is an unrealized capital gains tax, as the individual is required to pay tax on a sale that did not occur and gains that were never realized. Four of the eight charges against Ver are related to his exit tax calculation.

While all “covered expatriates” are subject to the exit tax, not all “covered expatriates” will owe an exit tax. There is such a thing as expatriation planning, said Attorney Richardson. One could plan for expatriation over a period of several years if one anticipates significant taxable capital gains. “Gradually, you can sell things and create a situation where on the day that you relinquish, you are subject to the exit tax but because there is no gain, you’re not going to pay an exit tax.”

Additionally, there is a dual citizenship at birth exemption by which one may avoid “covered expatriate” status (and the exit tax and covered gift rules) if he or she meets certain criteria. Attorney Richardson describes an example of two individuals seeking to relinquish—both individuals have acquired the same amount of wealth under identical circumstances, but one has a French citizen father and thus acquired French citizenship at birth, whereas the other individual has two U.S. citizen parents and did not acquire a second citizenship at birth. Despite having the same amount of wealth, the person with the French citizen father can be exempt from the “covered expatriate” designation while the other individual, with two American parents, who did not acquire dual citizenship at birth, may meet the conditions to be a “covered expatriate.” Attorney Richardson comments:

“Imagine exempting a group of people from ‘covered expatriate’ status not because of anything to do with their own actions but because of who their father or their mother was.”

While seemingly arbitrary, Attorney Richardson says this may be understood as non-taxation based on citizenship. This would explain the dual citizen from birth exemption as an extension of citizenship-based taxation:

“If you see citizenship as an ownership interest that the state has in the individual, then I think it’s very easy to see dual citizenship as dual ownership.” 

Date of Relinquishment for Tax Purposes

As reiterated throughout this report, relinquishment of U.S. citizenship for immigration purposes and tax purposes are treated separately. Recall that according to the current law under IRC 7701(a)(50),¹⁴ it states:

(50) Termination of United States citizenship

(A) In general 
An individual shall not cease to be treated as a United States citizen before the date on which the individual’s citizenship is treated as relinquished under section 877A(g)(4). 

According to section 877A(g)(4) of the IRC²²:

“(4) Relinquishment of citizenship
A citizen shall be treated as relinquishing his United States citizenship on the earliest of—

(A) the date the individual renounces his United States nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States pursuant to paragraph (5) of section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5)),

(B) the date the individual furnishes to the United States Department of State a signed statement of voluntary relinquishment of United States nationality confirming the performance of an act of expatriation specified in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(1)–(4)),

(C) the date the United States Department of State issues to the individual a certificate of loss of nationality (CLN), or

(D) the date a court of the United States cancels a naturalized citizen’s certificate of naturalization.

Subparagraph (A) or (B) shall not apply to any individual unless the renunciation or voluntary relinquishment is subsequently approved by the issuance to the individual of a certificate of loss of nationality by the United States Department of State.”

Therefore, in the case of Roger Ver, his date of expatriation for tax purposes, and thus the date he was required to use for calculating the exit tax, is the date on which he furnished to the U.S. State Department (March 3, 2014) a signed statement of voluntary relinquishment of U.S. nationality, confirming he committed an expatriating act found in INA 349A. In Ver’s case, the expatriating act was likely naturalizing as a St. Kitts and Nevis citizen (on February 4, 2014), which falls under INA 349A(1).

While Ver’s CLN states the date of expatriation as February 4, 2014, that is only relevant for immigration purposes. The date on which he expatriated for tax purposes was the date on which he notified the U.S. Consulate in Barbados (on March 3, 2014) of his committing an expatriating act. For the period between Ver’s committing the expatriating act and notifying the Consulate, albeit brief, he was still to be treated as a U.S. citizen.

Ver’s lawyers incorrectly advised him to calculate the exit tax based on February 4, 2014, which was the date listed on the CLN. The correct date was March 3, 2014, which was the date of notification of the expatriating act. While this has led to confusion, this discrepancy does not have a significant impact on the case, and Ver is not penalized for this error.

In the motion to dismiss, to put it simply, the defense claims the exit tax itself is unconstitutional, arguing it is tax on unrealized capital gains and that it infringes on the fundamental right to expatriate. The U.S. government, in its opposition to the motion to dismiss, argues there is no fundamental right to expatriate and that a tax on unrealized gains is constitutional. This matter is still being litigated.

Following Ver’s expatriation, his companies, MemoryDealers and Agilestar, by operation of law, converted from S-corporations to C-corporations. Both companies retained their status as “U.S. Persons” in the United States. As a result, Ver (regardless of his citizenship) was subject to U.S. tax on distributions and dividends received from those companies. Four of the eight charges against Ver are related to the preparing, filing, and mailing of his 2017 Form 1040NR, which was his nonresident alien tax return and was related to distributions from his U.S. companies. Notably, the 2017 tax issues are unrelated to his final expatriation return filed earlier.

Read the full article including the case timeline here.

At around 5:45 in the evening on Tuesday May 23, Judge Malte Grundmann entered the courtroom at Amtsgericht Plön to deliver his decision in the case of Prof. Sucharit Bhakdi. Following nine hours of deliberations, testimony and final arguments, all who were present in the gallery stood up eagerly awaiting the outcome to be read before the court.

Not guilty.

In an instant, the crowd of supporters outside the courthouse could be heard erupting into cheers and applause. Inside the courtroom, Prof. Bhakdi’s family and friends embraced with relief, the press hastily took notes, the legal counsel remained attentive, and all the focus was on Prof. Sucharit Bhakdi.

A nearly two-year long legal process had come to an end – or so one thought.

Case history

On May 1, 2022, the Kiel Public Prosecutor and new Commissioner for Combating Antisemitism in the state of Schleswig-Holstein, Silke Füssinger, issued an indictment against the defendant, Prof. Sucharit Bhakdi, charging him with two counts.

1. having incited hatred against a religious group and attacked the human dignity of others by insulting and maliciously disparaging that religious group, while acting in concert in a manner likely to disturb the public peace; and

2. having publicly trivialized an act committed under the rule of National Socialism of the kind described in Section 6 (1) of the International Criminal Code in a manner likely to disturb public peace.

(Note: translated from German to English)

The two charges refer to public statements made by Prof. Bhakdi, in which he compared the COVID-19 vaccination program to 1940s Germany. Prof. Bhakdi has opposed this vaccination program from the very beginning.

In an open letter to the European Medicines Agency (EMA), which was co-signed by more than 100 other doctors and scientists, Prof. Bhakdi demanded that the Agency revoke its approval of the gene-based vaccines. He consistently warned the public of its dangers.

His prediction that the vaccines would induce autoimmune-like inflammation and vascular damage throughout the body, leading to severe injury and death, has since been substantiated by the work of pathologists such as Prof. Arne Burkhardt and Dr. Michael Mörz.

While Prof. Bhakdi’s advice had been sought out by high-ranking government officials in previous years, his criticism of the COVID-19 vaccines proved unpopular with the authorities and the mainstream media. The two charges brought against Prof. Bhakdi should be understood in this context. They stem from statements made on two separate occasions.

The first charge of “incitement” relates to statements made during an interview titled “Die Impfung! Die Hölle auf Erden! Professor Bhakdi,” which in English means “Vaccination! Hell on Earth! Prof. Bhakdi.” The interview was filmed on an unknown date in April 2021 and released in excerpts the following month and then released in full in early July 2021. During the interview, Prof. Bhakdi can be heard saying the following:

“… what hit you guys. Faster than lightning. And if you are so indolent and you don’t rise up and say ‘no, you are not doing this with us,’ then you are done for. And then you wouldn’t have the possibility to flee. Israel, the Israelis can no longer flee. The country is closed. That’s what will happen here. And I was once asked by an American what I have to say about Israel, I said, for me the Israelis, this people that I admired more than any other people in the world, I was an admirer of Jews, yes, you know I’m a music lover, art lover. The greatest spirits were the Jews. I’m sorry to tell you this, yes. I’m sorry, I’m a Buddhist … Yes, I admired them. I am, you have seen my record collection, I went after these Jewish musicians to get a signature from them. Isaacson, David Oistrach, yes, I travelled hundreds of kilometres to hear them and to get their autograph. I adored them. And now they’re doing this. They, the people who fled from this land, from this land where arch evil was, and have found their land. Have turned their own country into something even worse than Germany was. So unbelievable. And then I told the Americans, that’s the bad thing about the Jews. They learn well. There is no people who learns better than they do. But they have learned evil now. And implemented it. And that’s why Israel is now “living hell”. And I told the Americans, “and if you’re not careful, America will be living hell too, and I’m telling you now, your country will be turned into living hell if you don’t rise up soon.”

The second charge of “trivialization of the Holocaust” relates to statements made during a speech at a campaign event in Kiel, Germany, on Sept. 24, 2021. During the speech, Prof. Bhakdi could be heard saying the following:

“It is clear to all in the know that with the formal approval of the vaccines, the first milestone of the agenda has been reached and the race is on to achieve the ultimate goal. This final goal is the creation of the new reality and involves nothing less than the second holocaust. The abolition of humanity in its current manifestation.”

According to the indictment, the maximum penalty, if found guilty, was two years in prison and/or a fine.

In October 2022, a hearing was scheduled for March 24, 2023. However, due to a court error, the hearing was postponed to Tuesday May 23, 2023, at 9 am at the Amtsgericht Plön (Local Court).

Public support

Shortly before the hearing began, at around 8:45 am on Tuesday May 23, Prof. Bhakdi and his wife, Dr. Karina Reiss, arrived at the Plön Local Court in Plön, Germany. The pair were met with an outpouring of support from concerned citizens who had traveled from across the country to attend the one-day hearing.

Supporters outside the courthouse could be seen holding signs that read “I stand with Sucharit” and “Sucharit, Unser Freund, unser Glück, Wir stehen an Deiner Seite,” which in English means “Sucharit, our friend, our luck, we are at your side.” Many of those in attendance stated that Prof. Bhakdi had made “a sacrifice” and that by sharing his scientific knowledge with the public, he “saved my life.” Several supporters cited Prof. Bhakdi’s book co-authored with his wife, Dr. Reiss, titled “Corona: False Alarm?”

Legal proceedings

The court hearing began at 9 am, and on that morning, crowds queued at the courthouse door for hours. The gallery accommodated approximately 40 people including the press. Several judicial officers monitored the courtroom throughout the day due to the high profile and politically charged nature of the case.

Judge Malte Grundmann opened the hearing announcing that based on the current evidence, he did not consider that the defendant, Prof. Sucharit Bhakdi, committed a crime. However, Judge Grundmann made it clear his assessment could change during the hearing.

The defense counsel representing Prof. Bhakdi consisted of lawyers Martin Schwab, Tobias Weissenborn and Sven Lausen. Lead lawyer Martin Schwab began his opening statement with Prof. Bhakdi’s biography, highlighting the defendant’s contributions to the fields of science and medicine. The defense then addressed the legal irregularities in the process and argued several reasons for the court to drop the case, including:

1) The prosecution did not have the full video of the interview “Vaccination! Hell on Earth! Prof. Bhakdi” at the time in which the prosecutor issued the indictment on May 1, 2022.

2) The prosecution did not make a timely effort to obtain and review the full video of the interview “Vaccination! Hell on Earth! Prof. Bhakdi.”

3) The indictment included sensitive information such as Prof. Bhakdi’s address, which could put him at risk.

It is worth noting that the prosecutor issued the indictment, requested access to the full video footage and declared the investigation closed on a single day – May 1, 2022, which is a public holiday in Germany.

The court adjourned for the judge to consider the arguments presented by the defense.

The court reconvened following a short break. Judge Grundmann allowed for the case to proceed. Prosecutor Füssinger agreed to omit mentioning the defendant’s address and began reading the indictment.

Following the prosecution’s reading of the six-page indictment, the defense claimed that Prosecutor Füssinger based the indictment only on having seen portions of the video from the interview “Vaccination! Hell on Earth! Prof. Bhakdi.” Therefore, the prosecutor’s assessment outlined in the indictment was irrelevant as the defendant’s statements were taken out of context.

“According to the jurisdiction of the German Constitutional Court, a person may not be sentenced for public incitement unless (1) their entire public statement is acknowledged uniformly and (2) any legally permissible interpretation of their public statement can be excluded,” said lead defense lawyer Martin Schwab. “The State Attorney is not allowed to take a single part of the statement out of its context.”

Furthermore, the prosecution had several opportunities to obtain and review the full video interview and did not do so. Instead, the prosecutor requested from the police a copy of the full video on the same day that she issued the indictment and closed the investigation.

Campaign video

The court watched Prof. Bhakdi’s campaign speech which took place in Kiel, Germany, on Sept. 24, 2021. The campaign speech was the source of the second criminal charge, “trivialization of the Holocaust.” The full speech was approximately 30 minutes long, and the statements in question constitute roughly two minutes and 15 seconds of the video.

Following the video, the first defense witness, a police officer, Mario Fritz, was called to testify. Fritz led the security and safety measures at the campaign event.

Fritz reported that the security team had two task forces in place, each consisting of six police officers to ensure a safe and peaceful event. Two of the mission cars were placed at the Rathaus Platz in Kiel to enable immediate action if needed.

The witness explained that the event was correctly registered for 200 participants for a time frame of three hours (5 pm to 8 pm). The event was closed by the event organizer one hour early, and the participants left the premises. The event was peaceful during its entire duration, and there were no administrative offenses or disturbances of any kind.

Fritz was unable to make a comment on the substance of Prof. Bhakdi’s speech as he had been on duty as a security and safety guard.

While his testimony was brief, it established before the court that Prof. Bhakdi’s speech did not incite a disturbance. As Fritz left the courtroom, he wished the defense team success.

In her rebuttal of the arguments, Prosecutor Füssinger argued that the defendant used aggressive words that belittle the Holocaust and scare people.

Court adjourned for a brief break.

A lesson in immunology

The court watched the video interview titled, “Vaccination! Hell on Earth! Prof. Bhakdi,” which included the statements that were the source of the first criminal charge, “incitement to hatred.”

The 90 minute long interview is played before the court in its entirety. The majority of the interview is focused on the dangers of the mRNA vaccines and their inefficacy. Prof. Bhakdi described basic immunology and why the mRNA COVID-19 vaccines cannot provide immunity or prevent transmission of a disease.

The portion of the video in which the defendant made the alleged criminal remarks constitutes approximately two minutes and 30 seconds of the 90 minute video.

It is clear that the purpose of the interview is to provide a detailed explanation of the mechanism of harm caused by the mRNA injections.

Court adjourned for a break.

An improper confrontation

Court reconvened and Prosecutor Füssinger repeated her charges against Prof. Bhakdi. She argued that the defendant and the interviewer, Kai Stuht, intended the interview to be shared on various channels.

In an unusual move by the prosecutor, she directly addressed the defendant, Prof. Bhakdi, despite the defense team making it clear to her and the judge that Prof. Bhakdi would not be making a statement to the court.

The prosecutor asked him if he knew through what channels and websites the video had been distributed. Prof. Bhakdi began to respond and was quickly stopped by his legal team. Defense lawyer Sven Lausen reminded the prosecutor that before addressing the defendant directly, she must first address the defense counsel.

According to the lead defense lawyer Martin Schwab, since the defense lawyers have told the judge and the prosecutor before the court proceeding that the defendant will not provide a statement, it was improper for Prosecutor Füssinger to address Prof. Bhakdi directly.

No more witnesses

The prosecutor called for further evidence to be taken regarding the distribution channels of the video arguing that the dissemination of the material should substantiate the suspicion of a crime.

The defense objected to the prosecutor’s request and reiterated that the prosecution had a duty to identify exculpatory evidence and failed to do so. Judge Grundmann agreed with the defense and considered the taking of evidence to be concluded. However, to satisfy a request from the Prosecutor, Judge Grundmann read out the investigating officer’s report.

The judge repeated that Prof. Bhakdi spoke about the importance of engaging in dialogue as well as upholding democratic principles. For the second time, Judge Grundmann stated that he does not see any criminal liability on behalf of the defendant.

He rejected the prosecutor’s request to hear additional witnesses.

Court adjourned for 60 minutes to allow for the prosecution and defense to prepare their final arguments.

Є16,200 penalty

The court reconvened. The defense reminded Prosecutor Füssinger not to address the defendant directly as the court was notified that the defendant would not be making a statement.

Füssinger began her final argument repeating the points outlined in the indictment against Prof. Bhakdi. She continued to suggest that comparisons between the coerced experimental vaccination program to 1940s Germany are antisemitic.

Despite Judge Grundmann not allowing for further evidence to be addressed regarding the distribution channel of the video interview with Kai Stuht, Prosecutor Füssinger stated that the defendant and Kai Stuht recorded the interview with the intent to share it on many platforms.

The prosecution pleaded for the judge to issue a penalty of Є90 paid daily for 180 days for the first charge and Є90 paid daily for 70 days for the second charge. She argues, in sum, for a total of Є90 to be paid daily for 180 days.

Prosecutor Füssinger rested her case.

Are we in the same courtroom?

The defense opened with lead lawyer Martin Schwab addressing the court. Schwab argued that the prosecution had misrepresented the statements of his client, Prof. Bhakdi. Prof. Bhakdi did not insult the Israeli people but rather expressed his concern for their well-being. He was not stirring hated, division or agitation but calling for peace, unity and for further dialogue – a point previously acknowledged by Judge Grundmann.

Furthermore, the defense argued that the entirety of Prof. Bhakdi’s statements were not considered by the prosecution. Instead, just a few selected sentences were examined and taken out of context. Defense lawyer Tobias Weissenborn stated that the prosecutor did not thoroughly investigate the case.

Regarding Prof. Bhakdi’s campaign speech in Kiel, Germany, which was the subject of the second charge, defense lawyer Sven Lausen argued that because it was a political speech, the speaker must be allowed to use illustrative and metaphoric language.

Lausen continued that Füssinger failed in her duties as a prosecutor. She had an obligation to collect and evaluate not only evidence that is incriminatory but also that which may be exculpatory, and she did not do so.

The defense then addressed the six-page indictment, which Lausen argued is poorly crafted, based on ignorance and consists of assumptions rather than evidence. He remarked that the indictment lacks critical information. Furthermore, the indictment failed to mention that the letter cited by Prof. Bhakdi in the Kai Stuht interview, is a letter written by Holocaust survivors to the EMA.

Regarding Prosecutor Füssinger’s assessment of the 90 minute long interview in which Prof. Bhakdi discussed immunology and the dangers of the mRNA vaccines, Lausen said he wondered if he and the prosecutor were sitting in the same courtroom when the interview was played.

The defense rested its case. Court was adjourned as Judge Grundmann considered the evidence.

The verdict

The court reconvened after a 40 minute break. The press, members of the public and the friends and family of the defendant stood up as the judge entered the courtroom.

Judge Grundmann found Prof. Bhakdi not guilty on both counts. Within seconds, the crowd of supporters outside the courthouse was heard cheering and applauding the decision.

The judge explained that Prof. Bhakdi was not liable for either charge and did not do what he was accused of. The judge referenced the importance of free speech and freedom of expression. He stated that Prof. Bhakdi advocated for peace and unity and expressed himself in a manner that allowed for open discussion. Prof. Bhakdi sought to create an atmosphere in which people can have open dialogue and embrace one another.

The hearing was closed. The press took photos, filmed the defendant and interviewed the legal counsel. Everyone in attendance slowly exited the courtroom.

“The judge was badly put under pressure by the mainstream media reporting before the hearing, and he deserves credit for not being influenced by this,” said lead defense lawyer Schwab.

Prof. Bhakdi and his wife, Dr. Karina Reiss, were cheered and applauded as they exited the court house.

“Prosecutor Füssinger’s mistake was that she looked for antisemitism at a place where it cannot be found at all. Sucharit Bhakdi is a stranger to antisemitism, and if she (the prosecutor) had watched the whole video footage before issuing the indictment, she would have seen herself that she had chosen the wrong target.”

Lead defense Lawyer Martin Schwab

How did we get here?

Note: All of the information provided below may be referenced at the Doctors for Covid Ethics’ website.

It is important to note that a year and a half before the not guilty verdict, the investigation into Prof. Bhakdi was closed by the Kiel authorities on Nov. 1, 2021, due to a lack of sufficient suspicion.

Kiel State Court Prosecutor Lorenz Frahm determined that a conviction was unlikely and therefore chose to close the case. However, after two individuals sent notices to the Prosecutor’s Office urging for a continuation of the investigation, the case was reopened on Nov. 24, 2021.

In summary, Prof. Bhakdi was investigated in 2021, the Prosecutor’s Office in Kiel closed the case due to lack of sufficient suspicion, only to reopen the case a few weeks later after the two individuals complained.

To best understand this, one must revisit key details surrounding the initial opening of the case against him.

Who is behind the prosecution of Prof. Bhakdi?

On July 14, 2021, three individuals filed complaints against Prof. Bhakdi for statements he made in an interview with Kai Stuht titled, “Vaccination! Hell on Earth! Prof. Bhakdi.” The interview, which focused on the dangers of the mRNA vaccinations and their inefficacy, was filmed in April 2021 and published in its entirety in July 2021.

Mr. Sigmount Königsberg, Commissioner Against Antisemitism of the Jewish Community Berlin, a well-known public figure and prominent member of Berliner Ratschlag für Demokratie (Berlin Council for Democracy), filed a criminal complaint against Prof. Bhakdi on July 14, 2021, at 10:46 am. Less than one hour later, at 11:17 am, the Chief State Prosecutor of Berlin notified the State Prosecutor of the complaint via email.

Dr. Elio Adler, a dentist and chairman of the civil society association Die Wertinitiative e.V, (The Value Initiative), filed a criminal complaint for incitement to hatred against Prof. Bhakdi to the Berlin police at 11:13 am on July 14, 2021.

A third complainant, Mr. Klaus Baumann, filed a criminal complaint against Prof. Bhakdi with the Police of Lower Saxony at 4:45 pm on July 14, 2021.

Following a several months long investigation, on Nov. 1, 2021, the Kiel State Court Prosecutor, Lorenz Frahm, issued a notice of the decision to close the proceedings against Prof. Bhakdi for lack of merit. All three complainants were notified. Both Mr. Königsberg and Dr. Adler objected the decision.

On Nov. 19, Dr. Adler notified the Prosecutor’s Office that he would file an appeal. On Nov. 24, Mr. Königsberg filed an official complaint against the dismissal of the proceedings. That same day, on Nov. 24, both men were notified by the Prosecutor’s Office of Schleswig-Holstein that the case against Prof. Bhakdi had been reopened.

Dentist turned counter-terrorism expert?

Dr. Elio Adler, who was the second individual to file a complaint against Prof. Bhakdi on July 14, 2021, is not only a dentist and public figure as the chairman of Die Wertinitiative e.V, but he also has a certificate in Terrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews. According to the university’s website, a study “in Terrorism and Political Violence examines selected approaches to knowledge generation around terrorism and counterterrorism.”

Careers pursued by those with this degree and/or certification involve the areas of law, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, policy research and consultancy, civil service, etc.

According to his Facebook page, Dr. Adler had attended the Munich Security Conference and the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism’s (ICT) World Summit on Counter-Terrorism in Israel in 2017. ICT works in collaboration with several partner organizations including the European Union, the United Nations, NATO, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and several others.

The fourth complaint

A fourth individual, Mr. Sebastian Willing, filed a criminal complaint against Prof. Bhakdi. However, Willing’s complaint did not reference, “Vaccination! Hell on Earth! Prof. Bhakdi,” which is the subject of the complaints filed by the three other men. Instead, Willing points to a campaign speech in Kiel, Germany, from Sept. 2021.

On Jan. 3, 2022, Willing filed a complaint via email to the Kiel Public Prosecutor’s Office at 8:14 p.m. He alleged that Prof. Bhakdi committed the crime of belittling the Holocaust by comparing the COVID-19 vaccination program to the Holocaust during a speech at a campaign event for the Die Basis [political] party on September 24, 2021. Willing urged the authorities to investigate further but requested that his name not be associated with the matter.

In Willing’s complaint he cited a Twitter post that contained a recording of a portion of the speech which includes the statements in question. The Twitter post is dated 6:51 pm on Jan. 3, 2022.

How did Mr. Willing see the Twitter post, watch the video clip in the post, contemplate Prof. Bhakdi’s statements and become convinced that they had been in violation of § 130 Ill of the Criminal Code, then draft a several paragraph complaint and submit that complaint within one hour and 20 minutes of seeing the source of the alleged antisemitic remarks in the Twitter post?

A collaborative effort

On Feb. 9, 2022, the head of LIDA-SH, Joshua Vogel, corresponded with the new Commissioner for Combating Antisemitism, Silke Füssinger, via email. The subject line in the email between Vogel and Prosecutor Füssinger read “first network meeting with LIDA-SH.”

According to its website, LIDA-SH is the independent reporting center for the state of Schleswig-Holstein. However, an article published in the German publication Kieler Nachrichten (KN) on Nov. 23, 2021, one day before Prof. Bhakdi’s case was reopened, says that LIDA-SH projects are “funded and initiated by the state.” Vogel is heavily featured in the article and describes a new initiative to tackle antisemitism in the area.

Back to the email. Vogel thanked Prosecutor Füssinger for the very productive exchange the previous day and wrote:

“As promised, the link to the video recording of the contribution of Mr. Bhakdi on 24.09.2022 [2021] on

https://twitter.com/Tzerberus1/status/1441790013268660230?s=20&t=3–dnOqZwTjAuhOQOMJrtA and

https://twitter.com/Tzerberus1/status/1441790180277428230?s=20&t=3—dnOqZwTjAuhOQOMJrtA”

Direct quote from the email exchange between Vogel and Prosecutor Füssinger. (Translated from German to English)

The images above are screen shots of the tweets included in the email exchange. Both of the links are from the same Twitter account, Tzerberus1. The links shared in the email date back to Sept. 2021.

But what is the account, Tzerberus1, posting now?

On May 25, 2023, Tzerberus1, posted to Twitter two videos of Prof. Bhakdi speaking at an event after his hearing on May 23, 2023. One of the videos posted catches the audio of an unknown man in the audience stating “it’s like a Holocaust.” Nevertheless, Tzerberus1 tagged the Federal Association of Departments for Research and Information on Antisemitism (RAIS) and reprimanded Prof. Bhakdi, who himself never mentioned such words.

Neither Prof. Bhakdi nor the audience reacted to the provocation, and the event continued without disturbance.

Apparently, the person or persons affiliated with the account, Tzerberus1, which posts were previously provided to the prosecutor by the head of the antisemitism reporting center for Schleswig-Holstein, LIDA-SH, attended and filmed an event in which a man can be heard mentioning the Holocaust during Prof. Bhakdi’s speech about mRNA vaccinations following Prof. Bhakdi’s not guilty verdict.

The legal case continues

Following a verdict, a dissatisfied party may file an appeal. There are two kinds of appeals. The first one results in an entirely new court hearing, in which the discovery of evidence is repeated. This is called “Berufung” in German. The second option is to file for what is called “Revision.” In this case, the facts on which the judgment is based are not called into question; instead, it is only reexamined whether or not in the initial decision the law was properly applied.

Two days after the hearing, on May 25, 2023, the same day the account Tzerberus1 posted video clips of Prof. Bhakdi and tagged the federal antisemitism reporting center, Prosecutor Füssinger filed an appeal with the Plön Local Court.

At this time, there is no written judgment in the case, and as long as there is no written judgment, the party who files an appeal may only decide which type of appeal to pursue once the written judgment is available to both the prosecution and the defense.

In Prosecutor Füssinger’s letter of appeal, she acknowledges that the type of appeal she decides to pursue will be determined once the written judgement is issued.

“They [the prosecution] hope for some kind of weak and spineless Pontius Pilate who will render an unjust judgement for fear of otherwise being defamed himself,” said lead defense lawyer Martin Schwab.

The fight in “official reality” is almost always different than the fight in reality.

The author thanks Jutta Degner who translated the court proceedings from German to English.

Introduction

Gideon van Meijeren is a Member of the Dutch House of Representatives for Forum for Democracy (FVD) and is widely regarded in the Netherlands as one of the most prominent and influential parliamentarians within his parliamentary group. Trained as a jurist, he is known, by supporters and critics alike, as a Member of Parliament who has a profound command of legislation and legal procedure, particularly in the fields of constitutional law, criminal law, and legislative drafting.

Since being elected to office in 2021, Van Meijeren has consistently focused on issues related to the rule of law, the separation of powers, freedom of expression, democratic oversight, and the limitation of state power. He is known for rigorously questioning ministers not only on policy, but on the constitutional basis, proportionality, and democratic legitimacy of their actions.

Outside Parliament, Van Meijeren has become a visible figure in the public and legal debate. He regularly appears in interviews and on podcasts (particularly in the New Media) and is a frequent speaker at lectures, demonstrations, expert panels, and other public events, where he reflects on democratic theory, civil disobedience, and historical patterns of institutional power expansion. His stance during and after the Covid-19 period, as well as his involvement in debates surrounding the Dutch farmers’ protests, have generated considerable political and societal discussion. (Read Gideon van Meijeren’s full biography here.)

While Van Meijeren has enjoyed a successful term challenging the current government as a Member of the House of Representatives, his battles against the establishment also extend to the courtroom, where he has been defending himself against charges of incitement since 2023. This high-stakes case not only has the potential to shape the Dutch political scene, it also seeks to indirectly grant new power to the courts to document, assess, and place value judgments on political opinions deemed unacceptable or potentially threatening. The case against Gideon van Meijeren is more than just a legal matter—it is the culmination of when a dishonest media meets corrupt politicians and malleable prosecutors.

Facts of the Case

[Note: The author thanks Esther Hendriksen for her diligent research assistance.]

In 2023, Gideon van Meijeren was charged by the District Public Prosecutor’s Office of The Hague on two counts of incitement to violent action against public authority under Article 131 of the Dutch Criminal Code.

The two charges stem from statements made during two separate occasions—the first on July 2, 2022, in Tuil, the Netherlands, and the second on October 10, 2022, in The Hague, the Netherlands (video published on November 13, 2022).

Van Meijeren asserts that, in both instances, his statements have been selectively edited. This is evident in the ellipses that appear several times in each passage, indicating where certain statements have been spliced together and where others have been completely removed. For the full context, readers are encouraged to read the entirety of both passages here.

1. Speech at the Farmers’ Forum: July 2, 2022

Van Meijeren presented a lecture at a closed farmers’ forum in Tuil. It was a private meeting held on private property and was only accessible to those who reserved a ticket in advance. Van Meijeren’s presentation was recorded and uploaded to FVD’s YouTube channel in two parts—the first part was posted on July 4 and the second on July 11. Van Meijeren’s statements were made in Dutch. Below is an English translation of the statements as they appear in the indictment.

“But what is also important to realize for a moment is that it is not always healthy in a democracy when there is a taboo on the use of violence. (…) And a taboo on violence, which currently rests on society while the state holds the monopoly on violence, can also ensure that the state never has anything to fear. (…) And do not forget either that even in our current Criminal Code an exception has been made to the prohibition on the use of violence. Article 41 of the Criminal Code provides that it is permitted to use violence if that is necessary to protect one’s own or another’s body, honor, or property against an unlawful attack. (…) And I also think it is important to show that fighting spirit, that militancy, because ultimately it can and must never be the case that farmers allow themselves to be driven from their land like meek lambs. Never. And, indeed, absolutely never. (…) At the end of the day, we all also have the right of resistance. (…) if that government abuses its monopoly on violence against its own population, then we are no longer dealing with a benevolent government, but with a malevolent, tyrannical government that must fall, that must go.”

2. Interview with Compleetdenkers: Recorded October 10, 2022 (published November 13, 2022)

Van Meijeren recorded an interview in The Hague on October 10, 2022, with journalist Steven Arrazola de Oñate for the Belgian podcast Compleetdenkers. The interview was published on November 13, 2022, on YouTube and Spotify. Van Meijeren’s statements were made in Dutch. Below is an English translation of the statements as they appear in the indictment.

“Plus, I think, yes, what we are doing here in parliament as such is pointless, the demonstrations as such are pointless. (…) in the past, in history, it has of course happened more often that regimes which really began to behave tyrannically were at some point brought down by the population. Because in the end we do have the numbers, and I do think that if that mass becomes so large and, so to speak, truly turns into a revolutionary movement, which of course clearly distinguishes itself from a protest movement (…) But a revolutionary movement in which it becomes so urgent for people who have nothing left to lose that they, so to speak, go to parliament and say: we are simply not going to leave here until the government is gone. Where unfortunately the past, and numerous other examples worldwide, show that there are often also victims, sometimes fatal victims.”

Note: Immediately following the last statement referencing fatal victims, Van Meijeren stated:

“That is terrible, and let’s hope we can prevent that and that everything remains peaceful. But that is what I ultimately hope for. It is sometimes referred to as a velvet revolution.”

However, the Public Prosecution Service did not include this in the indictment. Readers are, once again, encouraged to read the statements in their full context here.

The Aftermath

On July 12, 2022, following the publication of a second video of Van Meijeren’s presentation at the farmers’ forum in Tuil, the Public Prosecution Service launched a preliminary investigation into Van Meijeren’s statements with the purpose of forming an initial assessment of their criminal liability.

During this preliminary investigation, which lasted until the end of November 2022, the Public Prosecution Service gathered and assessed open source material such as speeches, interviews, and social media posts made by Van Meijeren, including his interview with the Belgian podcast, Compleetdenkers, which was published on November 13, 2022.

While the news of a preliminary investigation into Van Meijeren generated significant media attention, what followed the publication of the November 13, 2022, Compleetdenkers interview was notable.

A Coordinated Attack

On the evening of November 13, 2022, after the release of the interview, the Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS), which is part of the Dutch public broadcasting service and is funded by the Dutch government, published an article (featuring Van Meijeren’s Compleetdenkers interview) titled, “FVD MP Van Meijeren talks about occupying the House of Representatives.” This article contained a factual inaccuracy, namely that Van Meijeren advocated “to occupy Parliament.” This led to a media frenzy followed by widespread condemnation of Van Meijeren for something he did not say.

To reiterate, Van Meijeren never used the term “occupy.” Instead, Van Meijeren stated that he hoped there would be a peaceful movement that, figuratively speaking, goes to Parliament and advocates for a change in government. This is an important distinction given that occupying the House of Representatives is a criminal offense, whereas peacefully demonstrating at Parliament is a democratic right.

Eventually, NOS published a corrected article the following day. However, Van Meijeren argued that this incident was incredibly damaging for several reasons. The original article, with its incorrect headline and reporting, was at the top and front page of the NOS website and app for hours. Based on the average NOS daily visitors to the app and website, the article was likely viewed by at least 1.4 to 2 million people.

Furthermore, immediately following the publication of the original NOS article, several members of the cabinet and House of Representatives publicly commented on Van Meijeren’s remarks from the interview, reiterating a similar sentiment—namely, their strong disapproval of Van Meijeren’s statements.

Prominent individuals, including then-Minister of Finance and Deputy PM Sigrid Kaag and Minister of Justice and Security Dilan Yesilgöz, referred to Van Meijeren’s statements as “despicable incitement” and even suggested that this might be a matter for the Public Prosecution Service to investigate. The defense maintained that these comments from Minister Kaag and Minister Yesilgöz could have an unfair influence on the outcome of the trial and could point to the political motives of the prosecution.

Even the then-Prime Minister Mark Rutte posted about the interview, in which he said, “A member of parliament today speculated about disrupting the democratic process. That is reprehensible and totally irresponsible. The House of Representatives is the heart of our democracy, our most precious political asset.” (The post has since been deleted.)

In the subsequent weeks, several news reports and television programs repeated the incorrect reporting from the original NOS article. Such news items also featured legal experts and attorneys whose understanding of the matter was clearly based off of the initial incorrect article.

“To this day, I still encounter statements from people who believe that I called for the occupation of the House of Representatives and who, for that false reason, think it is right that I am standing trial today.”

~ Gideon van Meijeren (May 28, 2024)

Throughout the course of the preliminary investigation, there were 16 complaints of incitement and one report filed with various departments of the Public Prosecution Service and police across the country. In November 2022, the preliminary investigation was closed, and at the end of December 2022, the Public Prosecution Service submitted the open sources and complaints to the Attorney General and the Supreme Court.

By the beginning of April 2023, the Attorney General decided not to handle the complaints himself. That same month, the Public Prosecution Service then decided to initiate an official criminal investigation, called Eppelheim, which it launched on May 1, 2023. (Note: Investigations in the Netherlands are given random names, such as “Eppelheim.” It does not have any meaning.)

Van Meijeren then obtained a defense lawyer, Attorney Boriana Petkova, and the prosecution continued to be led by Public Prosecutor Wieger Veldhuis, who also facilitated the preliminary investigation. It is worth noting that Veldhuis has had several media appearances during the past years.

In one interview, in particular, with the Wayamo Foundation published on November 23, 2023, Veldhuis discussed “the Netherlands’ pursuit of universal jurisdiction (terrorism) cases” in countries like Iraq and Syria. When asked what type of evidence Dutch prosecutors rely on when bringing these cases to court, Veldhuis responded that “it is a lot of OSINT [open source intelligence] evidence, it is technical evidence, video footage, pictures, social media evidence—that is what we rely on.” The interviewer immediately followed up and asked how the Dutch courts have treated open source information as evidence and inquired about its admissibility. Veldhuis responded that OSINT investigators within the war crimes unit obtain much of that evidence themselves, but went on to state, “we also have examples that we got a percentage from witnesses.” In other words, one may interpret Veldhuis’ statements to mean that open source information is often provided to the prosecutors by witnesses or individuals who are not employed as official investigators.

The Hearing—May 28, 2024

A substantive hearing took place at the District Court of The Hague before a multi-judge chamber on May 28, 2024.

In order for the court to render a conviction of incitement, each of the following four criteria must be met:

1. Incitement must be regarded as an instigation to commit an unlawful act. The act must be punishable under Dutch law. (It is not a requirement that the act actually be committed.)

2. Intent (which may be conditional).

3. Must occur in a public place (the Internet can be considered a public place).

4. The statements must have been made verbally, in writing, or through an image.

Furthermore, a conviction does not require that the suspect’s statement(s) have led to any criminal acts. Nor is it required that it be reasonably likely that the criminal act is likely to occur. Additionally, the context, the audience, and other factors—including the content and the meaning of the statements—must be considered.

During the hearing on May 28, 2024, Van Meijeren addressed the court during his preliminary defense and called upon the judges to dismiss the case. He argued that the case was driven by political motives and that this infringed on his right to a fair trial. In doing so, Van Meijeren addressed the fact that many of his public appearances, media interviews, and social media posts had been documented and analyzed by investigators, despite those statements not being the subject of any criminal charge.

It is worth noting that the prosecution’s closing argument contained the following passage:

“The defendant calls for rebellion against the government. The defendant has long held the view that the Netherlands no longer has a functioning democracy. Laws are enacted unlawfully and citizens are being lied to. According to the suspect, there is no longer a purely political solution. He says: ‘I have repeatedly defended the position that we must resist the tyrannical government fiercely and vehemently. Resistance is necessary, even imperative.’ This has been the suspect’s consistent line in public appearances since January 2022.

These are abrasive remarks. They are also disturbing, coming from a member of parliament. But they are not punishable in themselves.

On two occasions, however, the defendant supplemented his call for insurrection with an incitement to violence. In the opinion of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, this crosses a criminal law boundary. These are serious offenses in which the defendant persists in his statements. These statements were made in the context of social unrest and anti-government sentiment, which led to heated tempers.”

In other words, a core component to the prosecution’s argument is that Van Meijeren’s calls to resistance are inciting when combined with his persistent dissemination of certain political views in which he is critical of the Dutch government. During the preliminary defense, Van Meijeren argued that the judges were thus being asked to place a value judgment on political opinions, which is beyond the obligations of a court, which is intended to be politically neutral.

“The answer to the question of whether my call for resistance is punishable, is made dependent—by the Public Prosecution Service itself—on my political views. Those political views will, therefore, have to be assessed by you (the judges). Otherwise, those many statements would not need to be included in the file.”

~ Gideon van Meijeren (May 28, 2024)

Van Meijeren then reflected on the considerable time and energy that he had had to put toward this case. He also referenced the Political Parties Act, which was submitted to the Council of State on April 8, 2024 (just one month prior to the hearing). This proposal would allow for the Council of Europe to ban political parties if a party advocates violence to achieve political goals. In addition, it considers the actions of a political party member attributable to the entire party (in certain contexts).

Additionally, Van Meijeren addressed the incident in which the government-funded media, NOS, published a highly deceptive article following his Compleetdenkers interview of November 13, 2022. Van Meijeren argued that Minister Kaag’s and Minister Yesilgöz’s public statements, which followed the publication of the article, might have influenced the prosecutor to pursue this case and might influence the judges to issue a ruling that aligns with the position of (previously) high-ranking government officials.

Van Meijeren concluded that each of these points undermined his right to a fair trial and that the case ought to be dismissed. Public Prosecutor Veldhuis responded to Van Meijeren’s preliminary defense and asserted that his decision to pursue prosecution was not influenced by anyone or any outside factors.

Following consideration of Van Meijeren’s request, the court largely dismissed the points addressed in his preliminary defense. The judges accepted the public prosecutor’s assertion that he was not influenced, and the hearing proceeded.

Unacceptable Opinions

Videos depicting a recording of both statements subject to criminal prosecution were played before the court, followed by a question-and-answer session between Van Meijeren, the public prosecutor, and the judges. Defense lawyer Attorney Boriana Petkova was also given an opportunity to question her client.

At this time, Van Meijeren continued to reiterate that he called for peaceful, nonviolent resistance. Markedly, the public prosecutor also questioned Van Meijeren regarding his statements from other events, which were included in the case file as open sources (but were not subject to criminal charges).

To put it into perspective, the public prosecutor specifically asked Van Meijeren: “When did you learn about the World Economic Forum (WEF) conspiracy theory?” And shortly thereafter, he asked, “did you have any idea how many people might take action because of the mention of that World Economic Forum story?”—as if to suggest that the mere mention of the WEF could lead people to take action (therefore, best not to mention the WEF at all).

Following this question-and-answer session, the prosecution delivered its closing arguments in which Public Prosecutor Veldhuis argued that Van Meijeren’s public speeches and debates revealed several consistent themes, including the following:

• That there is a “malicious tyrannical government” that turned against the population

• That the government lies

• That laws are unjust

• That democracy no longer functions properly

The public prosecutor referred to these themes as “the background against which the defendant calls for resistance.”

Similarly, the public prosecutor reiterated that Van Meijeren had made statements “against the backdrop of conspiracy theories surrounding nitrogen and anti-coronavirus measures, the alleged role that the WEF would play in this… and the secret influence of the WEF on the Dutch government in this regard.”

(Note: In the timeline below, the official report of findings for the open sources are grouped into similar themes based on content.)

Additionally, the prosecution reflected on the emotions and other characteristics of the audience to which Van Meijeren was speaking during the July 2, 2022, farmers’ forum private event. The prosecution stated that emotions were heightened and there were feelings of uncertainty and insecurity among the population. The prosecution also cited several protest actions and demonstrations to illustrate the general atmosphere at the time in which both statements were made.

The prosecutor continued to reference several speeches and interviews from Van Meijeren that were not the subject of the criminal charges but were included in the case file as open sources. With reference to the two statements which form the basis of the two counts of incitement, the prosecutor argued that, in both instances, Van Meijeren had intent and knowingly accepted the considerable risk that his statements could lead to violent action.

The prosecution stated that if the court found that Van Meijeren’s statements met the criteria for incitement, the court must then assess if a conviction is compatible with Article 10 Freedom of Expression of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Special protections do apply to politicians when expressing themselves. However, the prosecutor argued that Van Meijeren’s speech and his calls for resistance are not protected under Article 10 of the ECHR and that a restriction on freedom of expression in this case would be justified for the protection of the public order.

The Intelligence Angle: AIVD report

Following the conclusion of the prosecution’s closing argument, the defense was given the opportunity to address the court again. Van Meijeren cited several legal irregularities and misrepresentations in his case. He clarified the content of his statements, indicating that he advocated for peaceful, nonviolent demonstrations and that “Article 41 of the Criminal Code recognizes that there are legitimate circumstances in which self-defense, even if violent, may be necessary and justified to protect one’s own body, honor, or property.” Van Meijeren also referred to then-Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who in November 2021, acknowledged this right to revolt during a debate on Covid-19 restrictions.

Furthermore, Van Meijeren remarked that there were striking similarities between the prosecution’s characterization of his messaging and the rhetoric used in the AIVD report of May 2022, a report addressing “anti-institutional extremism.” (Note: The AIVD report is published annually by the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands and provides an assessment of security risks and domestic threats.)

What’s more, the AIVD report for May 2022 was published on April 17, 2023, around the same time that the Public Prosecution Service decided to launch its official investigation into Van Meijeren.

Attorney Petkova, for the defense, addressed the court on this specific matter as well, arguing that the anti-institutional extremism section of the AIVD report specifically refers to a movement that believes an “evil elite” controlling the leadership in the Netherlands seeks to cause harm to the population. According to the AIVD report, this narrative could undermine democracy and, therefore, it is considered a potential threat.

Continuing on this topic, Attorney Petkova stated:

“After all, it is striking, to say the least, that the Public Prosecution Service first assessed the statements made by the client in July 2022 and then again in November 2022, but only decided to prosecute in May 2023, at the same time as the publication of the AIVD report.”

She continued to address the substance of the case and argued for Van Meijeren to be acquitted on both charges. However, Petkova stated that if the court found Van Meijeren’s statements met the criteria for incitement, he should not be convicted as his statements are protected under Article 10 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to freedom of expression.

The Fate of All Dutch Citizens

At the conclusion of the one-day hearing on May 28, 2024, Van Meijeren was the last person to address the court, in which he opened up personally. He shared his motivation for becoming a public servant and revealed that prior to entering politics, he had led a peaceful life and had a promising future as a lawyer. However, he felt deeply concerned about the direction of his country, and while understanding the risks of becoming a public figure, sacrificed a comfortable life to enter politics with the goal of helping to create a better future for the Dutch people.

“But regardless of the outcome of this trial, I will continue to fight relentlessly for the restoration of our democracy. Even a conviction in this political trial will not lead to the end of my mission, but will instead confirm the need to continue.… In this case, you are not only judging my fate, but also the freedom of expression of all Dutch citizens and, with that, the foundation of freedom itself. So let your decision be based on the truth and let justice prevail.”

Nearly two weeks following the one-day hearing, on June 11, 2024, the court found Van Meijeren guilty on two counts of incitement. He was sentenced to 200 hours of community service or 100 days of imprisonment. Two days later, on June 13, Public Prosecutor Wieger Veldhuis was promoted to Advocate General of the International Crimes Department of the Public Prosecution Service (CTER).

Shortly after the judgment was issued, defense lawyer Petkova filed an appeal in July 2024. The grounds of appeal concerned the court’s rejection of two defense witnesses, the rejection of the defendant’s request during his preliminary defense, the court’s reliance on a one-sided historical context in which the statements in question were made, the court’s erroneous characterization of the defendant’s statements as “inciting,” and the misinterpretation of Article 10 ECHR—namely, that the defendant’s speech was not protected under freedom of expression.

The Appeal Hearing

On January 28 and 29, 2026, a two-day appeal hearing took place at the Court of Appeal in The Hague.

On the first day, Van Meijeren presented his preliminary defense, which largely mirrored the arguments he had put forward at first instance on May 28, 2024. As before, he argued at length that his prosecution bears the hallmarks of a political trial, and that the court of first instance had wrongly dismissed or inadequately addressed his arguments on that point. In the appeal, he added an important new element, invoking the principle of equality: according to Van Meijeren, comparable statements made by politicians from other political backgrounds have not led to prosecution, which in his view points to unequal treatment.

The court indicated that it was unable to rule immediately on this preliminary defense. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the issues raised, the judges stated that a careful assessment was required. A decision on these points, including the question of the admissibility of the Public Prosecution Service, will, therefore, be delivered together with the final judgment.

The second day of the hearing was devoted to the main defense. Van Meijeren systematically dismantled the reasoning of the lower court’s judgment, addressing it point by point. His performance was widely noted for its legal precision and thorough command of the case file, earning him recognition even beyond his own political supporters.

Later that day, the defense presented a video statement by Prof. Dr. Andreas Kinneging, Professor of Legal Philosophy at Leiden University. In the video, Kinneging outlined the concept of the right of resistance within the Western legal tradition and concluded that Van Meijeren’s statements about the state of the country were both appropriate and justified in that context. Although the Advocate General initially objected to the screening of the video, the court rejected those objections and admitted Kinneging’s statement into the proceedings.

Throughout both days, the public gallery was filled to capacity with supporters of Van Meijeren, while tens of thousands of others followed the hearings via a livestream. The presiding judge was repeatedly forced to intervene when Van Meijeren’s submissions were met with warm applause.

At the conclusion of the appeal hearing, the court announced that its judgment will be delivered on March 5, 2026, at 1pm, at which time it will also rule on the admissibility of the Public Prosecution Service.

(Note: The Solari Report will continue to provide updates on the case as they become available. Read the full report, including the case timeline available at Solari.)

The European Commission proposed a new law seeking to centralize the EU media sector into a single market overseen by the Commission and national regulatory authorities through a new European Board for Media Services.

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), proposed by the Commission on Sept. 16, 2022, is portrayed as an effort to promote media independence and pluralism while safeguarding against disinformation and foreign interference in the media sector by establishing a set of standards in the form of EU law.

A core component of the EMFA is the establishment of the European Board for Media Services, which will consist of representatives from national regulatory authorities as well as a representative from the European Commission. It will be the duty of the Board to monitor the EU media sector, to issue opinions on market concentrations, to provide special advice and to ensure uniform compliance with the Regulation, among other tasks.

While the EMFA proposal has received some praise for its stated objectives – namely to protect media freedom – it continues to be scrutinized by various press organizations and members of the European Parliament for loopholes that would allow the surveillance of journalists while paving the way for unprecedented interventions in the internal media market by the European Commission.

Despite this criticism, the EMFA continues to progress through the EU legislative process. On June 21, 2023, the European Council secured a mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament. One month later, on July 20, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) adopted its opinion on the proposed legislation, bringing the Regulation one step closer to becoming EU law as the Commission intends to conclude negotiations before the next EU elections.

The current framework

To understand the significance of the proposed EMFA Regulation, one must revisit the existing framework the EMFA will expand upon – The Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). The AVMSD’s current advisory body to the Commission, The European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), will be replaced by the new European Board for Media Services (the Board).

The current framework, the AVMSD, only applies to audiovisual media services, defined as “a service providing programmes, under the editorial responsibility of a media service provider, to the general public, to inform, entertain or educate, using electronic communications networks, either broadcast or on-demand.”

The EMFA, however, applies to the more broadly defined “media service provider” (MSP) which is described as “a natural or legal person whose professional activity is to provide a media service and who has editorial responsibility for the choice of the content of the media service and determines the manner in which it is organised.”

Therefore, this means that in contrast to the ERGA, the Board will oversee not only audiovisual media services but the press sector as well. The ERGA’s November 2022 position paper on the EMFA proposal suggested that the Board’s authority to regulate the press may be problematic for Member States. 

“Given the sensitivity of press matters, as well as national specificities (including constitutional), ERGA wishes to explicitly and unambiguously state that it is neither its vocation nor its intention to regulate the press sector.” (Excerpt from the ERGA’s position paper on the EMFA)

Ilias Konteas, Executive Director of the European Magazine Media Association (EMMA) and the European Newspaper Publishers’ Association (ENPS), whose legal specialization is in European media law, told Children’s Health Defense Europe that the Board’s competency over the press sector would undermine a core component of press freedom – the principle that the free press is solely responsible before the law and the courts for its content.

“The press should remain free from any European regulatory oversight,” said Konteas. “Since in the vast majority of Member States the press is self-regulated, the delegates in the Board would have tasks, at the European level, that are outside of their national mandate.”

Regulating the media, quite literally

The most apparent difference between the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) and the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) is in the name itself. The current legislation, the AVMSD, is a directive, and had to go through national transposition and implementation, whereas the EMFA is a regulation, and will not be subjected to the same level of oversight by the European Parliament.

In the EU, there are several types of law: directives, regulations, decisions, recommendations and opinions. For the purposes of understanding the EMFA proposal, this section will briefly focus on the differences between a directive and a regulation.

A regulation is a type of EU law that sets an objective and defines how to achieve it. Once the law is adopted, it is effective immediately in all EU Member States. It is legally binding, supersedes national laws and Member States are limited in their ability to determine how to achieve the set objective.

A directive is a type of EU law that sets an objective but does not define how to achieve it. Member States may determine how to achieve the set objective through the establishment of national laws. 

Executive Director Konteas says media policy has primarily been a competence of the Member States. “This triggered some debate on whether the Commission was allowed to propose a media regulation.”

History

The initiative for a new media freedom act was first mentioned by European Commission President Ursula von Der Leyen during her State of the Union speech in September 2021, in which she said, “Media companies cannot be treated as just another business. Their independence is essential. Europe needs a law that safeguards this independence – and the Commission will deliver a media freedom act in the next year.”

Several months later, in December 2021, the Commission announced a call for evidence for safeguarding media freedom in the EU, which was open to the public for feedback and consultation until March 2022.

In May of that year, the Commission constructed its impact assessment report and submitted it to the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), whose duties are to provide “quality assurance,” support the Commission and provide assessments during the early stages of the legislative process.

It is worth noting that the RSB is portrayed as an advisory board to the Commission and is described as “an independent body,” according to its website. However, the RSB consists of nine members, five of whom are from within the Commission itself, including four high-level Commission officials and a Commission Director-General as the chair of the RSB. The remaining four members are recruited from outside the Commission.

One function of the RSB is to review and issue opinions on impact assessment reports. An impact assessment report must include the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the initiative, who and what will be impacted by it and how, as well as the results of and the strategy taken during the consultation process. 

The RSB may issue one of three opinions on an impact assessment report: “positive,” “positive with reservations” or “negative.” A proposed initiative may only be adopted if it receives a “positive” or “positive with reservations” opinion. If a “negative” opinion is issued, the draft report must be reviewed and resubmitted to the RSB.

Furthermore, it is important to consider that the RSB is a technical group, whose main function is to complete and verify impact assessment reports. In this instance, it is presumable that a key objective was to ensure that all areas within the internal media market were addressed and therefore subject to the Regulatory oversight of the Commission. The following section should be understood in this context.

Unpopular from the start?

Just one month after the Commission submitted its impact assessment report on the EMFA initiative, the RSB returned a negative opinion in June 2022.

The RSB’s initial opinion stated that the EMFA impact assessment report failed to explain the single market failures and the regulatory gaps. It did not explain with sufficient evidence the problems the EMFA seeks to address, how the measures will address these problems nor the prevalence of such problems across different media markets and Member States. 

Furthermore, the opinion stated that the report did not clearly demonstrate the need for and effectiveness of certain measures and lacks transparency with regard to the stakeholders’ differing views during the consultation process.

Following the negative opinion, the Commission submitted a revised impact assessment report on July 11, 2022. Several weeks later, the RSB issued its second opinion: “positive with reservations.” 

The second opinion stated that the revised impact assessment report of the EMFA still contained significant shortcomings, and in particular, it lacked the use of evidence to define or describe the problem it seeks to address. Additionally, the third point of concern read: “the analysis of single market and distributional impacts, among different media services and between Member States, is not sufficiently developed.” 

Despite this, the Commission was able to proceed, and on Sept. 16, 2022, it published its proposal for “establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market,” which it named The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). 

The Explanatory Referendum of the EMFA draft legislation states the regulation “seeks to tackle a series of problems affecting the functioning of the internal market for media services and the operation of media service providers.” 

According to the proposal, the EMFA will adhere to and expand on existing policies while addressing the regulatory gaps. Furthermore, it is constructed on four objectives:

“Fostering cross-border activity and investment in media services by harmonising certain elements of the diverging national media pluralism frameworks, in particular to facilitate cross-border service provision.”

2. “Increasing regulatory cooperation and convergence through cross-border coordination tools and EU-level opinions and guidelines.”

3. “Facilitating provision of quality media services by mitigating the risk of undue public and private interference in editorial freedom.”

4. “Ensuring transparent and fair allocation of economic resources in the internal media market by enhancing transparency and fairness in audience measurement and allocation of state advertising.”

The extended text on each of the four objectives may be read in the original draft EMFA proposal.

At first glance, the language used in the text of the proposal may instill a positive impression on the average EU citizen, resident, journalist, publisher or MEP. The use of phrases like “quality media services,” “fair allocation of economic resources,” “editorial freedom,” in addition to the name for the legislation, “European Media Freedom Act,” may suggest this proposal could empower and protect journalists and media professionals of various sub-sectors. That is, however, only in the absence of a closer look at the actual text.

Behind the fluff and buzzwords woven throughout the introductions, the media appearances and the speeches celebrating the EMFA proposal, in-depth examination of the text of the proposed Regulation unveils an unprecedented effort to establish a unified EU media sector under the central control of a newly established European Board for Media Services, which has the authority to censor and restrict the press.

A closer look at the EMFA

The Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) is the committee responsible for the EMFA. The Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) committees serve as associates. The procedure is led by Special Rapporteur Sabine Verheyen, an MEP from the Christian Democratic Party of Germany. Given that the EMFA proposal is still in the legislative process, there are several opinions and amended versions of the proposal. The subsequent text will analyze the Council’s negotiating mandate.

European Board for Media Services

(Author’s note: The bold text in the images indicate changes to the original draft EMFA proposal.)

The EMFA establishes the European Board for Media Services (the Board), which will replace the existing European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA). According to the Commission’s original EMFA proposal, the ERGA lacks the resources and ability to solve cross border issues, to manage regulatory matters and is limited in its scope of action.

The Board is portrayed as an independent body. Article 9 asserts “the full independence of the Board” and states that the Board “… shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government institution, person or body. This shall not affect the competences of the Commission or the national regulatory authorities or bodies in conformity with this Regulation.” 

This means the Board shall act independently, however that independence shall not interfere in the areas in which the Commission and/or national regulatory authorities are, according to the legislation, involved in the Board’s functioning, management and execution of tasks.

On examination of the structure of the Board, its secretariat and its tasks, as described in Articles 10 to 12, it is clear that the Commission has a significant role in the Board’s operations and overall composition.

This has raised questions about the legitimacy of the independence of the Board asserted in Article 9. Even the ERGA’s position paper makes note of this contradiction in the following excerpt:

“The independence of the Board formulated in Article 9 is contradicted in practice by several provisions contained in the following articles on the internal functioning of the Board, the secretariat and the Board’s tasks.”

Structure of “the Board”

The Board will be composed of representatives from national regulatory authorities and each member will have one vote. A Chair and Vice-Chair will be elected by the Board members and may serve a maximum of two one-year terms. It will be the duty of the Chair to keep the Commission informed about the Board’s activities and to consult the Commission in preparation for its work programme.

Additionally, the Commission will designate a representative to the Board who will participate in the Board’s “deliberations” but will not have voting rights.

“During an event a few months ago, the Commission said that they plan to assign eight to 10 people to the Board, which is quite significant even without voting rights,” said Konteas.

Furthermore, the Board must adopt its rules and procedure and the development of its work programme only after having consulted with the Commission. While the Board may invite experts to attend meetings, permanent attendees may only be permitted if the Commission agrees. 

“If in any Member State, the government appointed a person to participate in all meetings and activities of the national media regulator, this would immediately ring some alarm bells for the risk of government interferences.”

Furthermore, even the staff of the Board is assigned by the Commission. As stated in Article 11, the secretariat will be provided by the Commission.

The Secretariat shall assist the Board with administrative and organizational activities and work closely with the Board and its Chair “drawing up on deliverables.”

However, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), and The Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee opinions both seek to some what limit the role of the Commission.

Article 11 of the IMCO opinion removes the provision stating that the Secretariat shall be provided by the Commission, and instead states that “The Board shall be supported by an independent bureau.” However, both Committee’s uphold Article10(5), which allows the Commission to appoint a representative to the Board.

It will be determined during the later stages of the legislative procedure if such opinions will be adopted.

Tasks of the Board

Similar to the ERGA, the Board acts in an advisory and supportive position to the Commission. Unlike the ERGA, the Board has a much broader scope of competency and has regulatory authority over the press sector. 

According to Article 12(1), the Board shall advise the Commission on media matters within its range of competence and promote and ensure the consistent application of the Regulation. The Commission is frequently referenced in the text of Article 12.

“When requested by the Commission” the Board shall provide opinions on technical and factual issues. “In Consultation with the Commission” the Board shall draw up opinions regarding requests for cooperation between regulatory bodies and requests for enforcement measures in case of a disagreement between natural regulatory authorities on national measures. “Upon the request of the Commission” the Board shall draft opinions on media market concentrations.

It is worth noting that while the ERGA’s position paper welcomes the new tasks given to the Board, it urges for a reduced role of the Commission:

“It is therefore inappropriate that the EMFA only or mainly provides for tasks of the Board to be executed either ‘in agreement with’ or ‘at the request of the Commission.’ The position paper requests that requests with ‘in an agreement to the Commission’ should be deleted.”

Furthermore, as outlined in Article 12(h), it is the duty of the Board to merely “assist the Commission in drawing up guidelines with respect to the application of the Regulation” including Articles 23(1), (2), (3) and (4) as well as the factors to consider when assessing media market concentrations.

A new provision added by the Council allows for the Commission to place time limits when requesting advice or opinions from the Board.

The Board shall also offer mediation in the case of disagreements between national regulatory authorities and ensure the harmonization of standards related to design of devices or user interfaces. The Board will organize dialogue between very large online platforms (VLOPs) and media service providers (MSPs) and report those findings to the Commission to ensure the best practices for audience measurement systems. 

One of the key objectives of the EMFA is to promote media pluralism. This raises questions as to how the Board will ensure news consumers have access to a wide range of opinions and perspectives from varying sources. An examination of Article 12(k) and Article 16 provide further insight into how the Board will manage media services established outside the EU.

A “serious and grave risk” to public security

In Article 12(k), it is a task of the Board to “coordinate national measures related to the dissemination of or access to content of media services from outside of the Union that target or reach audiences in the Union.”

Therefore, the Board may limit or restrict access to content from media services outside the EU that target audiences within the EU through “national measures” if that media service is deemed “to present a serious and grave risk of prejudice to public security.”

If the Board, in consultation with the Commission, considers a media service from outside the EU to pose a “serious and grave risk” to the public, then news consumers within the EU may not have access to this content. While this is already happening with the banning of outlets like RT and Sputnik, the EMFA Regulation would provide a further legal basis for restricting access to content outside the EU that is deemed a threat to public safety and security.

This appears to be a key component of the EMFA, as outlined in Article 16.

It states that media services or media service providers established outside the EU, “irrespective of their means of distribution or access, target or reach audiences in the Union where, inter alia in view of the control that may be exercised by third countries over them… present a serious and grave risk of prejudice to public security.” This indicates that by default, if a media service provider originates outside the EU, it is considered to be subject to control by third countries, and therefore is a risk of prejudice to public security.

Article 16(3) states that the Board, in consultation with the Commission, shall establish the criteria to be used by national regulatory authorities “when exercising their regulatory powers over media service providers.”

This is a clear admission that the national regulatory authorities monitoring the media sector at the direction of the Board and the Commission will have regulatory powers over media service providers.

In summary, while the Commission is concerned that media services originating outside the EU may present a risk to public security because they may be controlled by third countries, it simultaneously seeks to control the domestic EU media sector through the Board.

The great irony

Many organizations have expressed doubts over the EMFA proposal. Hundreds of press publishers and press publishers associations from various European countries have signed an open letter to the EU Co-legislators on June 27, 2023.

The open letter, which requests that the EMFA “lives up to its name,” addresses numerous issues with the proposal. It opens with a broad remark stating that several provisions of the EMFA are, in fact, counter-productive to protecting press freedom.

One of the many issues raised surrounds censorship, which has become a greater problem following the Digital Services Act (DSA), which gave social media companies and online platforms the right to remove and restrict content that does not comply with their terms and conditions.

“EMFA does not go far enough to safeguard freedom of expression and pluralism online and prevent censorship by very large digital platforms (VLOPs), that is becoming a widespread problem. The protection of freedom of expression must be considerably strengthened to guarantee the unfettered distribution of lawful European press content, and for pluralistic information to remain freely accessible online without undue interferences from VLOPs…”

(Excerpt from the open letter, “The EMFA Must Live up to its Name”)

More power to online platforms

Article 17 establishes the functioning and management of media service providers’ content in relation to the providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs). According to the original draft proposal, a VLOP provider is defined as “a provider of an online platform that has been designated as a very large online platform pursuant to Article 25(4)” of the DSA. 

In April 2023, the Commission designated several entities, including but not limited to Amazon Store, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok and others, as VLOPs.

Prior to a media service provider (MSP) publishing content to a VLOP, it first must enter into a contractual agreement with the VLOP provider in which it confirms that it is an MSP, that it is editorially independent of Member States and third countries and that it is subjected to the regulatory requirements and complies with a co- or self-regulatory policy.

Unlike the original draft proposal, the Council’s negotiating mandate includes an additional provision which would require MSPs to provide the contact details of the relevant national regulatory authority, so in cases where an MSP is suspected to have not complied with point (c), the VLOP provider can contact the national regulatory authority for confirmation.

According to Article 17(6), “the Commission shall issue guidelines to facilitate the effective implementation of the functionality referred to in paragraph 1,” to ensure the consistent application of the article.

Therefore, MSPs must declare their independence from Member States and third countries while submitting to control and regulation by national regulatory authorities and the Commission via the Board.

“Any labelling and/or allowing VLOPs or ‘civil society organisations, fact-checking organisations and other relevant professional organisations’ to question media companies’ self-declarations is problematic as it allows third parties to restrict the rights of media companies,” said Konteas.

Suspensions, restrictions

If there were any doubts that providers of VLOPs would censor or restrict content, Article 17(2) makes it clear.

Providers of VLOPs will suspend MSPs for failure to comply with the Regulation and will restrict the visibility of content published by MSPs that is considered incompatible with its terms and conditions.

When this occurs, the provider of the VLOP must warn the MSP prior to the suspension or termination period and allow an opportunity for the MSP to respond. If an MSP considers that it has been repeatedly suspended without justification, the two parties must engage in a discussion about the matter in a timely manner, at the request of the MSP.

While it is unclear what specifics would justify suspension, restriction or removal of content, one can assume that MSPs deemed to produce “harmful” content and “disinformation” may be subject to repeated measures.

In Article 18, it states the Board shall meet regularly with providers of VLOPs, representatives of MSPs and members of civil society to ensure the best practices for the implementation of Article 17 “and to monitor adherence to self-regulatory initiatives aimed at protecting society from harmful content, including disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference.”

What about media freedom?

While much of the EMFA seems to place further restrictions on MSPs and media services both within the EU and originating outside the EU, many may be left to wonder where the “freedom” in the European Media Freedom Act is.

Article 4 outlines the rights of MSPs and is the only article dedicated to this subject. It states that MSPs have a right to exercise their economic activities within the EU as long as the MSP complies with Union law. Member States must respect effective editorial freedom of media service providers and along with their national regulatory authorities must not try to interfere with or influence the editorial policies or decisions of MSPs and must respect the protection of journalistic sources.

Furthermore, Article 4(2a) addresses the rights of MSPs in the context of what Member States and national regulatory authorities must not do. Much of the controversy surrounding the EMFA is its loophole which allows Member States to spy on journalists, MSPs and their associations if deemed a national security threat.

What is arguably one of the most overlooked aspects of the EMFA, is that MSPs are not provided protections from the potential abuses of power by the Commission and national regulatory authorities, which are given unprecedented controls over the media like never before.

“Once the risk of political pressure over editorial decisions has been acknowledged, it would be naïve to exclude the possibility that it might happen at European level,” said Konteas. On behalf of the EMMA and ENPS, he said that they are very concerned that there is no safeguard against the risk of interference by the Commission.

“In fact, we suggested to extend the protection of Art. 4(2), and especially of 4(2)(a), to potential threats coming from the European Union, its agencies and bodies, which should be just as bound to respect media freedom and independence as the governments and authorities of the Member States.”

In the context of the rights afforded to MSPs, the EMFA’s focus is to protect from potential abuses by Member States but not by the Commission, while reducing the role of Member States and granting significant authority to the Commission.

The prospects

If the EMFA were to be incorporated into EU law, one can only imagine the myriad of ways in which the EU media sector would change. A once self-regulated sector would then come under the control, albeit indirectly, of the European Commission, an unelected and largely unaccountable body.

“Europe is a diverse region. Europe has always relied on the diversity of its culture, on its geographical diversity, on its linguistic diversity and the media markets across the Union have been built on these elements. So we don’t feel that there is one common market that justifies the regulatory intervention by the European Commission … The supervision from a central authority, this European Board, is unprecedented for our sector. What we feel is also problematic is the direct involvement of the European Commission. It’s like you have a European government supervising the media. I don’t think this fits very well.”

(Excerpt from Ilias Konteas during a debate on France24, November 2022)

The Commission, via the Board and national regulatory authorities, seeks to monitor the media, yet it is the job of the media to monitor them. While the EMFA Regulation would apply to any person or entity who meets the criteria for the broadly defined “media service provider,” it is important to consider how the field of journalism, which is intended to be a check on the powerful, will be affected.

A journalist’s duty is not to any government, governmental body or corporation. A journalist’s duty is to the public. This very principle, that has for so long been cherished, could be greatly jeopardized if the EMFA becomes law, especially in its current form.

Yet, the EMFA does not just include provisions that restrict and control journalists and “media service providers,” it also seeks to control you – the reader, the consumer of news.

During the past three years, the language of public health was used to destroy our health under the guise of protecting our health. Now the language of media freedom is being used to control and destroy the media under the guise of protecting the media.

The EMFA will regulate your access to information, under the guise of protecting you from “harmful disinformation” and “foreign manipulation.” Should the European Commission and the European Board for Media Services determine what it is true or what is false, what you should read or what you should not watch? You, the reader, should be left to decide that on your own.

The Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) is expected to issue its opinion on the proposal in September of this year, and then it will enter into a trilogue negotiation with the Council. The Commission, Parliament and Council all seek to conclude negotiations on the EMFA Regulation before the European Parliament elections in Spring 2024.

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